THEOLOGY

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EDITED BY E. G. SELWYN, M.A.

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

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A Monthly Journal of Historic Christianity

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EDITORIAL

The article by the Principal of King's College in this number makes it unnecessary that we should otherwise review Croce's book, *On History*,* which was published in English last year. The volume certainly justifies an *obiter dictum* which Professor A. E. Taylor let fall in these pages some time ago, when he alluded to Croce as "that slightly superior person." None the less his thesis that "every true history is contemporary history" has great interest for believers in a historical faith. "Mere narrative is nothing but a complex of empty words or formulas asserted by an act of the will"—or, in other words, chronicle, not history; history comes into existence only when the past is lived again and its documents rethought in contemporary experience. In some such definition, perhaps, is to be found the secret of the Fourth Gospel, and, more broadly, of the synthesis between the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith. And for Christians the awakening of religious belief means that the fact of Christ has passed from being chronicle to being history.

One of the best historians, as distinct from chroniclers, of our time is Mr. George Trevelyan; and his recently published *British History in the Nineteenth Century* (1782–1901)† is a conspicuous example of how the past lives again in the present. It is no mean feat to have compressed the greatest century of British achievement into a little over 400 pages, and that without omitting a single date of importance. It is interesting, too, to note how Mr. Trevelyan makes the development of communications, and the work of inventors generally, one of the main threads of continuity in the story. Most significant of all, for our purpose, is the fairness with which he brings out

* *Theory and History of Historiography*, by Benedette Croce. Harrap, 1921. 15s.
† Longmans, 1922. 12s. 6d. net.

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the contributions made to English life by the several religious, philanthropic, and political movements of the period. When he wrote of Garibaldi, Mr. Trevelyan let us see his strong faith and hope in Liberal ideals; and the same was true of his biographies. But here there is something which stands out more clearly than that faith and hope. This history is above all things a charitable book. The author approaches his characters and their policies not as a doctrinaire, but as a fellow-pilgrim. We doubt whether a historian could bestow any greater benefit on our generation than to write of the past in such a spirit.

Mr. Trevelyan makes an acute criticism of the national sentiment behind Canning, when he threw himself into the cause of Greek emancipation.

> The very name of Hellas, like that of Italy in the next generation, had a strange power to move our unemotional grandfathers. But when once the heirs of Athens had been freed, Serb, Bulgar, and Armenian appealed in vain for British sympathy, though the cause was the same of delivering ancient races long submerged under the stagnant waters of Turkish misrule. The classical and literary education that then moulded and inspired the English mind had power to make men sympathize with Greece and Italy, more even than Christianity had power to make them sympathize with the Balkan Christians.

And so, again, of the return of the Ionian Islands to Greece in 1863:

> Hellenic sympathies and Liberal principles were the motives of an action which has few analogies in history.

One should surely add the ardent religious faith of Mr. Gladstone to this list of motives—all the more, since the chief hope to-day that the love of Greece and what Greece stands for will continue in modern England lies in the work and witness of the Church to which Gladstone belonged.

"Every true history is contemporary history." We see to-day on the soil of Asia Minor the heirs of the victors of Marathon and of Salamis reclaiming again the Ionian shore for civilization. Criticism of the modern Greeks is common, and may be true; but it is not relevant. They may have all the faults which we should expect any nation to have which had been for many centuries under the Turk. But they have memory, vocation, promise; and they are fighting against an enemy more barbaric even than ancient Persia. Happily, Christian sentiment is becoming thoroughly aroused in this country upon the question; and we doubt whether the

Government could now survive a further betrayal of the Christians of Asia Minor. And we have with us the strong support of bodies like the Anglo-Hellenic League, whose recent publication of Sir Arthur Crosfield's pamphlet, *The Settlement of the Near East*, deserves a warm welcome. Yet, as Burke said, "the price of liberty is eternal vigilance"; and the situation is not safe yet.

Recent events have tended greatly to strengthen the ties of religion between the Eastern Churches and our own. The strong protest addressed by the Archbishop of Canterbury and others to Lenin on behalf of the Patriarch Tikhon has the prayers of the English Church behind it. And as we go to press, we read of the appointment of a Greek Metropolitan for the Orthodox congregations in Western Europe, who is to have his chair in London. Meanwhile striking witness has recently been borne to the solidarity of Faith and Worship which binds our own Communion to the Communions of the Eastern Orthodox Church. As Mr. Douglas has made abundantly clear in his book,* no question of "Reunion" here arises, seeing that our formularies do not explicitly rest upon the authority of the Seven Œcumenical Councils. Any such suggested "Terms of Intercommunion,"† therefore, as those drawn up by Dr. Headlam and his Committee in April, 1921, must share the fate which befell the similar effort of the Non-Jurors in the seventeenth century. What is now aimed at is more modest and more practical—namely, the personal adhesion of such a number of Anglican clergy to the "Declaration" set forth as will impress the authorities of the Eastern Church with our Catholic standing, and prepare the way (so we hope) for closer practical co-operation *in sacris* between the Orthodox and ourselves.

The article which we print this month from the pen of Mr. Shebbeare is symptomatic of the obstacle which makes full Reunion with the East as yet impossible; and the "Document" containing the reply of the Swedish Bishops to the Lambeth proposals is a further illustration of it. We should define the obstacle by saying that our Communion carries in its mind and heart an unsynthesized factor, which it feels too valuable to forfeit but cannot yet wholly integrate with its Catholic Faith. It is vital that we should understand this factor as fully as possible, yet it is not easy. Mr. Hanson, the Chaplain of King's

* *The Relation of the Anglican Churches with the Eastern Orthodox.* The Faith Press, 1921. 12s.

† S.P.C.K., 1921. 6d. net.

College, in a recent very able article in the *Church Quarterly Review*, wrote as though the true child of the Reformation was Modernism, meaning a conception of Christianity dominated by the categories of Immanence; and when Mr. Shebbeare says that Kant's doctrine of "justification by goodwill" is a form of what Luther meant by "justification by faith," he seems to be approximating to this position. Yet what Mr. Shebbeare defends in his article taken as a whole is not Modernism, but Protestantism. Luther was no enemy to the categories of Transcendence; and Mr. Shebbeare's suggested test-question, "Do I maintain my faith in God's mercy through Christ?" would almost do for a Catholic. Almost, but not quite. For Catholicism would add the words, "in His Church." And those words would be for him the symbol of faith in the Third Person of the Blessed Trinity. It is there, in our judgment—in the development of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit ("the Transcendent immanent in experience," to quote a phrase of von Hügel's)—that synthesis will be found. But there will have to be much research into first principles before the task is done.

"One touch of Nature," etc. A passage in *The Round Table* for June throws a flood of light on the recent lockout in the engineering trade:

> We know of one works in which the men had co-operated loyally with the management over a long period, and had accepted in the last twelve months lower piece-work rates, changes in operations, overtime—everything that the management had been able to convince them was needed to meet the conditions in which orders had to be taken. "What is the result of it all?" they say now. "We are locked out." On the day before the lockout took effect, the manager of those works sent for the chief shop steward. He had been with the firm for years and held a unique position, founded on personality. His employers respected him because he was a first-class workman and because he was reasonable and recognized something of their difficulties; and as he always told his men the truth and never let them down, he kept their confidence without losing the firm's. He shook hands with the works manager and said: "I don't think I shall be coming back here to work. I am not blaming you; I know you are in the Federation and have to go with them. But this makes me feel I've been a failure. You know what my work here was: my whole life was in it. After this, I don't feel I can face it again with the fellows here. They'll be saying—some of them have said it already—'Well, Jack, what about your policy now! You see where it's landed us.'"

We hope that the numerous employers who were opposed to the lockout in the first instance will insist on their Federation machinery being overhauled, so that those of moderate views and human sympathies may in future call the tune.

The Fall and Recovery of Man (Mowbray, 1s. 6d. net), by the Warden of Liddon House, is a welcome reminder of one of the cardinal doctrines of the Faith. Mr. Cheshire follows closely Mr. McDowall's suggestive *Evolution and the Need of Atonement* in his endeavour to show that the Christian doctrine is fully consistent with modern science; and he points out how the knowledge of the ages spent on man's development before he became a free, self-conscious being serves only to enhance the tragedy of his Fall. This is true; but we think that the doctrine needs to be broader based than that. Mr. Cheshire does not say clearly whether he regards the Fall as involving a *privatio* or a *pravatio naturæ*, nor how far we should regard it as involving man in Divine "punishment" or "wrath." It is the powerful treatment of these problems, and the setting of the whole issue in the grand environment of the Supernatural, which makes William Law's handling of the subject so fresh and valuable, even after a century and a half. His brief treatise, *The Spirit of Prayer*, with its appendix, *The Spirit of Love*, deserves to be more widely read than it is. It has all the eloquence and power of one of Plato's Myths—seems, indeed, in part to follow consciously their structure; while, as an interpretation of the opening chapters of Genesis, it is both faithful and convincing. In one or two important points, moreover, Law seems to anticipate the views of a much later day.

The passions of the public seem to have seriously obscured the deeply important issue underlying the reprieve of the murderer True. The Home Secretary had no difficulty in showing from Coke, Hale, Blackstone and other acknowledged authorities that all precedent was on his side when he refused to send a certifiably insane man to execution. But what is the principle underlying this precedent? We believe it to be this—that an insane man is incapable of making his punishment into an act of reparation. Society might kill him as an act of self-protection, but it could not execute him as an act of punishment; for punishment implies the possibility of repentance. In that case, English custom conserves a vital spiritual issue.

SPIRITUALISM

SPIRITUALISM may roughly be described as a belief in the existence and life of a spirit in man, apart from and independent of, his material organism, and in the possibility of intelligent intercourse between spirits embodied and disembodied.

Needless to say, if the fact of such intercourse is established religion cannot hope for long to remain unaffected by it. "The authority of creeds and Churches," wrote the great spiritualist F. W. H. Myers, "will be replaced by the authority of observation and experiment. The impulse of faith will resolve itself into a reasoned and resolute imagination, bent upon raising even higher than now the highest ideals of man."* I quote this utterance because it is eminently temperate and lies midway between the extreme opinions of those who, like Sir William Barrett, would prefer to keep psychical research quite distinct from religion, and those who, like Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, assert unhesitatingly that, for them, Spiritualism "*is* religion."

As Christian teachers we are doubtful if Spiritualism is friend or foe. We suspect it. But all the same we are called upon to adopt some attitude towards it, and we find this no simple task. So long as Spiritualism was pilloried as witchcraft, it was enough to say: "This is plainly the work of the Devil"; "These practices have always been condemned in God's Word"; "Beware of black magic!" But for two reasons it has become increasingly difficult to be content with this position. The first is that a large number of people, who have resorted to Spiritualism for consolation owing to the war, have come to suspect the explanation of devils as no more than a cover for ignorance on the part of the clergy. The second is that Spiritualism has engaged the attention and, in many cases, the support of some of our leading scientists and University professors. As a result, it can now be satisfactorily dealt with only after a careful survey of the results of scientific inquiry.

Coming to our subject, we find a doubt often expressed as to how far spiritualistic happenings are legitimate material for investigation. The reply to this is that these happenings occur in the first instance *unasked and unsought for*. They are not solely the product of séances, mediums, and so forth. For example, Sir William Barrett tells† of some acquaintances of his who were not spiritualists, who were puzzled and annoyed by raps and other inexplicable noises that frequently occurred when their daughter Florrie, a frank, intelligent child, aged

* *Human Personality* (abridged edition), p. 341; *cf.* p. 7.
† *On the Threshold of the Unseen*, pp. 38, etc.

about ten years, was present. The greatest precautions were taken to detect fraud or trickery, but finally he and the parents were fully convinced of the genuineness of these occurrences. Here are psychical phenomena occurring, so to speak, spontaneously. And why may not a scientist examine them as well as the phenomena of electricity or chemistry? Risks there may be, but, as somebody has observed, we do not stop chemical inquiry because foolish people poison themselves.

The phenomena of Spiritualism include, firstly, the movement of material bodies—chairs, tables, etc.—by what is termed psychic force; and, secondly, communications supposed to come from disembodied spirits.

In connection with the movements of material bodies, Dr. Crawford, a Doctor of Science and Lecturer on Mechanical Engineering at Belfast, conducted experiments with the aid of a medium where, *with no one touching it*, a table rose some 18 inches in the air and remained so suspended. Sir William Barrett, who was present, failed to lower it, though he jumped upon it and sat there till he was tipped off. Then the table turned upside down of its own accord, and when he tried to move it, it was as firmly pressed to the ground as if it had been screwed there. On the same occasion two pieces of a metal trumpet rose in the air and dodged all his efforts to hold them. When invited to take hold of them he found he could move them to and fro, but they resisted every twisting motion so firmly that it was for all the world as though the bases of the separate parts were embedded in solid concrete. Those who doubt the sanity of all this must read for themselves. Unquestionably these phenomena are vouched for on very strong security.

Now suppose for a moment they are genuine, then at once the old accusation that table-tilting was due to the unconscious pressure of some sitter has to be abandoned. Moreover—and this is most important—it is manifest that we find here something akin to physical force. Spiritualists judge it to be an *intelligent* force. Force of some kind there certainly is. Dr. Crawford used weights and measures, and showed that when a table (weighing 10 lbs. 6 ozs.) was levitated without contact —the medium being seated on a scale—the weight of the medium was increased by approximately that of the table (9 lbs. 12 ozs.). The resistance of the table to movement, when levitated, was at a maximum when the table was pushed downwards and towards the medium at an angle of 45 degrees. This indicated some connection between the psychic force and the medium, and the conclusion was immensely strengthened by experiments with a movable electric bell-push. Dr. Crawford prepared a bell-push so delicately adjusted that a slight breath

would establish contact and cause a bell to ring. Imagine the table to be levitated. If the bell-push was placed on the floor directly underneath no ring was produced. When the bell-push was raised to a height of about 2 feet above the floor, pressure was registered and the bell rang.* By repeated experiments it seemed natural to conclude that there was some path of force outward from the medium that proceeded in the shape of a curve to the underside of the table. As to the nature of this force, Dr. Crawford admitted its mystery. The most he did was to offer a tentative hypothesis. He was inclined to think it a form of chemical energy associated with the human nervous system.

At this point a few observations may be justified. The evidence at disposal appears to point to some kind of personal force as the cause of these phenomena. The nature of this force is at present uncertain, but, so far as can be judged, it by no means suggests the necessity of discarnate spirits. For this reason, it seems unwise to take it for granted, as some are disposed to do, that all spiritual phenomena are due to devils. If it transpires they are not due to spirits either good or bad, the "religious" explanation will be as discredited as the spiritualist. The spirits will be proved an illusion, and the devils exposed as a bogey. It would seem to be wiser to expect the discovery of some new personal force. Those, of course, who reject any theory of psychic force are likely to find themselves presented with a statistical table of pounds per square inch for the pressure of devils.

These phenomena bear more directly on religion than is commonly recognized. Spiritualists have not been slow to link them up with what they affirm to be similar instances in history—ancient and modern. It will occasion us less surprise, then, to find that from the New Testament the "levitations, the tongues of fire, the rushing wind, the spiritual gifts, the working of wonders" are classed as phenomena familiar to spiritualists; or that the "materialization of the two prophets upon the mountain" (*i.e.*, of Transfiguration) is held to be "extraordinarily accurate when judged by psychic law."† We may quite happily regard this attempt to embrace all spiritual marvels within the fold of Spiritualism as premature and inconclusive.

Now let us consider the question of supposed communications from departed spirits. We observe at the outset that all intercourse between human mind and human mind is

* *Reality of Psychic Phenomena*, pp. 91, etc.

† *New Revelation*, by Sir A. Conan Doyle, pp. 77, 79. *Cf. The Vital Message*, p. 161.

normally *indirect*. Whenever a thought is transferred from one mind to another, it is by way of physical media. When I read a letter from a friend, the pen, paper, and writing of my friend, and my own optic nerves, are in a true sense the media of thought transference. Now Spiritualism asserts that intercourse can be *direct—i.e.*, apart from any of the known channels of sense. And since, usually, our bodily organism provides the normal channel of communication, this is tantamount to saying that intercourse is possible between minds embodied and minds disembodied.

We do well to recognize what follows if this sort of communication can be proved. The departed, it may be presumed, have not physical bodies as we have, composed of earthly particles. "But," it will be argued, "the want of such a body cannot be held to make intercourse impossible, if it has been shown that intercourse can take place apart from the bodily organism."

It would take too long to give in full the reasonings which are thought to establish such direct communication as possible, but they are so fundamental that they must at least be indicated.

It is allowed, then, that for man in his ordinary state of consciousness, communication with his fellows is ordinarily through the bodily organism—*i.e.*, through physical media.

But, it is immediately added, man's ordinary consciousness does not reveal his full personality. Indeed, at any given moment, it is only a very little that consciousness tells us of ourselves. Bound up with our full personality is a multitude of past experiences, conversations, joys, sorrows, of which only a comparative few are ordinarily present to consciousness. At a given word they come back to our consciousness—we remember them, as we say—but otherwise, while they belong to the full make-up of our personality, they are not part of our conscious life.

The aim, then, of the spiritualist will be to endeavour to shut off ordinary consciousness and to allow the full personality to emerge in its entirety. And here we discover the why and wherefore of the medium's trance. The trance of the medium is employed to place ordinary consciousness in abeyance. The person is for the time undisturbed by the diverting impressions which crowd in through the eye, the ear, etc., and is the more ready for a direct communication, supposing this can occur. Another method used to obtain a similar result is crystal-gazing. This is regarded as a highly specialized form of "brown study," which permits an unusual degree of freedom to the subconscious self. And in these states of trance communications undoubtedly come.

Before dealing further with the subject of the medium's trance, we may consider the alleged communications. A study of them reveals much that is self-contradictory, much that is more or less obvious fabrication of data furnished by sitters, and much that is remarkable for its accuracy. Cases of fabrication and shuffling are abundant. A crowning instance of this kind occurred when Dr. Hall* asked for a fictitious niece, Bessie Beals, who was produced and was communicating fairly fully by the third sitting. When told that there was no such person as Bessie Beals, it was still maintained that she was there, and that her mother had asked about her before; then it was admitted that a mistake had been made after all, and that her name was Jessie Beals! So again, for purposes of evidence,† a spirit at a séance in America was asked to describe a certain séance in England and to convey messages. The spirit gave the American sitters all they asked for, but later it was found that the house in England was wrongly described, the phenomena *there* witnessed wrongly represented, and that no messages had been received in spite of the spirit's assertion to this effect.

Yet, granted that these messages are not genuine, they still require to be explained scientifically. The bent tree has its explanation no less than the straight one, and there are, as has been said, many communications that are remarkable for their accuracy, as, for example, the one relating to the group photo mentioned in *Raymond*. The spiritualist offers us the spirit hypothesis. What is it worth?

Without dispute, it *does* cover a good many of the facts. According to the spirits' own version, something like what we understand by "possession" takes place in regard to the medium. This will account, in cases where it occurs, for the medium's voice or handwriting approximating to the voice or handwriting of the communicator while on earth. Most important of all, it has an answer for the question, "Where do the communications come from?" It offers a definite and intelligible source for information given in communications, which is outside the knowledge of anybody on earth, as, for example, where someone inserts a finger at random in a newspaper and asks for the word at which the finger points, the answer being correctly given.

Mistakes will be accounted for in various ways. There are difficulties on the other side. Spirits become aware of a medium through a special psychic light connected with him. Approach to this light dazes them. They are not certain if they really get messages through. They feel an inability to describe their new surroundings. There are drawbacks, too, in connection

* *Proc. S.P.R.*, pp. 177, 178. † *Ibid.*, pp. 509, 510.

with the medium. In the trance state, he is extremely open to the power of suggestion from others, and often may be giving his own subconscious ideas or those telepathically received from other living minds.

But the first criticism of this hypothesis is not concerned so much with the fact that some communications are genuine and others false. The astounding thing is that false messages are given with exactly the same assurances of sincerity as true ones. An absolutely unsatisfactory part of the spirit theory is that it provides no criterion for distinguishing messages as true or false. A spiritualist may try to help matters by accounting for the mistakes, but the conviction persists that, when all allowance has been made for possible causes of mistakes, *the supposed spirits themselves are unable to distinguish the true from the false!* And it is impossible not to be suspicious of the whole spirit theory when we reflect that this curious shortcoming is one of the marked characteristics of a person in an hypnotic trance!

A bewildering faculty for impersonation is manifested by a hypnotised person. Tell him he is a total abstainer and he will denounce the drink habit. Tell him he believes in moderate drinking and he will proceed to contradict all he has just said. Here we find three of the characteristics of supposed spirit controls:

(1) The appearance of an apparently new personality.
(2) Ingenuity in filling the part.
(3) Desire for consistency, but complete inability to distinguish the true from the false.

Now hypnotism appears to be a phase of the personality responding to the promptings of suggestion, and there may be reason to think that a similar process occurs in the spiritualistic trance. A spiritualist may claim that the suggestion comes from a departed spirit. This cannot be allowed to have been proved. Take, for example, two famous supposed spirit-controls whose communications can be read in the proceedings of the S.P.R.—Sir Walter Scott and Stainton Moses. We find that Sir Walter Scott appeared as control, *for the first time*, the day after the sitter had been reading his *Life and Letters*. We find that Stainton Moses took control, *for the first time*, the day after the sitter had been reading that gentleman's book, *Spirit Teachings!** Here we may feel justified in supposing that nothing more was happening than the medium responding to some subconscious suggestion on the part of the sitter. Over and over again subconscious suggestion from this side proves

* *S.P.R.*, vol. xxviii., p. 85.

to be the rule. Each attempt to bring forward some clear exception just fails to be convincing. We feel as people might who, being very hazy about the laws of magnetism, were urged to believe that the power of a magnet to attract iron filings was quite plainly the work of an indwelling spirit.

Let us pause to recognize that we are confronted by a great mystery. We have yet to learn the full limits of our personal influence! And it is for scientists to discover for us the laws which govern this subconscious suggestion and intercourse between personalities. A case is recorded where a wife, at the very moment her husband was killed in the war, had a detailed and exact vision of the scene. By what process? Vivid dreams are afterwards verified in fact. What are the laws which apply? What is the true explanation of premonitions? If telepathy be a fact, what circumstances regulate it, and what are its limitations? How far does the subconscious influence of one mind on another leave its traces after a person is "dead"?

It will be admitted freely, we believe, that Christianity has a duty to interest itself vitally in the problem whether such messages come from spirits or merely from suggestion on "this side." Christianity, as the Bible affords ample witness, has a recognized place for the influence of both angels and devils. Of the former it asks, "Are they not all ministering spirits, sent forth to minister for them who shall be heirs of salvation?" The latter comprise "the Devil and his angels." They also have their work—they seek whom they may devour. These spiritual influences, it will be noticed, are regarded as definitely moral, either good or bad. And Christianity has one great test by which they may be tried. Do they, or do they not, bear witness to Christ incarnate? "Hereby know ye the spirit of God: Every spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is of God: and every spirit that confesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is not of God." The anxiety of Christianity in the present instance does not arise solely from fear of possible bad spiritual influence: it arises because, so long as clear proof of spirit communication is wanting, there is the awful possibility of people placing their trust in what may be a most pitiable delusion.

We are face to face with the facts that a large number of people attach credibility to the communications received, and that this is doing an untold amount of harm. Spiritualists of understanding admit freely that no supposed communications, whether through private persons or professional mediums, should be accepted uncritically at their face value. "A good deal of this struck me as nonsense," is one of the remarks of Sir

Oliver Lodge during the séances mentioned in *Raymond*. Professor Barrett tells us that even substantial agreement among communicators may be due to nothing more than a reflection of the common opinion of mediums generally.

The actual fact is that communications differ exceedingly. One so-called spirit saying declares that in their statements spirits "will differ indefinitely according to their different temperaments, and the manner of soul they are. . . . There will be any number of creeds based upon after-death experiences, which vary according to the character of the individual. . . . For instance, you will not find . . . any authoritative declaration as to any religion that will be recognized as true by all the spirits communicating. They are of all stages and phases, and the religion of some will be absolutely unthinkable by others."* (Note curious use of future tense—"You *will* not find," etc. It is so exactly what we on this side of the grave should say!)

Another supposed spirit says, "I believe absolutely in the divinity of Jesus Christ and the Immaculate Conception," distinguishes Christ from Buddha, Mahomet, and Confucius by his unique divine origin, and holds a sound doctrine of the Holy Trinity.† Other communications could be given to bear out Sir Oliver Lodge's statements that the spirits "always insist that their information is but little greater than ours," and that they are still "fallible gropers after truth": that they "are making progress through darkness into light, through ignorance into knowledge." "We have nothing to tell you," another supposed spirit-saying goes, "that was not known to the seers and that was not declared by Jesus."

On the other hand, when we turn to Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's accounts of Spiritualism, as given in *The Vital Message*, or *The New Revelation*, we find almost a total absence of the caution that marks Sir Oliver Lodge's writings. The would-be simplicity of it all almost provokes a smile. He does indeed admit that "opinion is not absolutely uniform yonder, any more than it is here," but sweeps this difficulty lightly to one side and makes it quite plain that he is prepared to accept the general opinion of spirit communicators. According to this, no religion upon earth has any advantage over another. There are orders of spirits and Christ is the greatest Spirit of whom they have cognizance, though he is not God. He came down to earth to set an example. There is nothing of Atonement or Redemption. Hell is a blasphemous conception. Belief in Purgatory is justified by reports. There are probationary

* *After Death*, aman. W. T. Stead, pp. 77, 78.
† *Speaking across the Border Line*, by P. Heslop, p. 58.

spheres—hospitals for weakly souls. Otherwise conditions of life in the beyond are pleasant. Sir Arthur Conan Doyle is so impressed by this view of Christianity that he gives it some measure of finality. The sooner the Bible is put on the shelf the better, and as for modern religious beliefs, "Christianity," he writes, "must change or perish."* As a general principle this may be intelligible, but in the sense which he conveys, we can only reject the assertion as an unwarranted presumption.

General accounts from the newly-passed-over would make it appear that at first they do not know they are dead, and are a long time understanding that their conditions are changed. The individual finds himself in a spirit body, the exact counterpart of his old one, save that all weakness or deformity has passed from it. As he is still in his old surroundings, he is met by other spirits and then, by the guidance of a guardian angel, goes out upon his new life. A period of sleep usually occurs here, and afterwards strength returns and new life begins. Those who have interests in common are united, life is full of interest and occupation. Life beyond is for a limited period, and then they pass to other and ever higher spheres. It is pre-eminently a life of the mind. Preoccupations of food, money, lust, pain, etc., are of the body and are gone. Music, the Arts, intellectual and spiritual knowledge, have increased. The spiritual world would seem to be a kind of counterpart of the physical world with flowers, etc. Spiritual bodies may be made visible at will. Those who die as children here grow naturally to maturity in the world beyond.

It hardly needs to be explained that such "impressions from beyond" are here given in their most coherent form, regardless of the uncertainty, the insecurity, and even the nonsense which attends them. And even so, when this concession is made, where is the exalted spiritual information for which human souls yearn? Where are the traces of new illumination that may be supposed to be theirs who have passed beyond the veil, and are by at least one step nearer to God? We fail to find them. Instead, perhaps, we may find one spirit describing as a "nice old fellow, but profane," another spirit who, in earlier days, in the spirit world "used to swear like a Turk." Is it to be wondered at that those who are familiar with the lofty spirituality of the Old Testament prophets should regard these communications by comparison as paltry, uninspiring, and profoundly disappointing?

It is to be observed that, according to the supposed communications, sex, language, sight, hearing, mental equipment, and the rest, still continue in the world beyond. Dr. Jacks,

* *New Revelation*, p. 70.

in his Presidential Address before the S.P.R., said they could not be set down off-hand as belonging to a world wholly different from this. "If you find sex, you find much more than sex—namely, a whole biological system; if you find vision, you find light, and if the light, then everything that goes with the light, and this gradually expands into wider and wider contexts until you get the whole order of nature as we know it here and now." He lays stress on the point that the other world from all accounts would seem to be so much like this, that "it is hard to resist the conclusion that they are one and the same." The same thought seems to be in Sir Oliver Lodge's mind when he writes that the spirits "are no longer in *matter* truly, and therefore can no longer appeal to our organs of sense . . . but for all we know, they may exist in the ether and be as aware of space and of the truths of geometry, though not of geography, as we are." "Let us not be too sure," he says, "that their condition and surroundings are altogether and utterly different from those of mankind."*

We must leave spiritualists to settle this problem. And meanwhile, all the accounts may be, as we are disposed to think they are, nothing more than a bizarre attempt on the part of our subconscious minds to picture the conditions which prevail in the world of spirit, with no more information on the subject than is to be had from observation of this physical world and from human conjectures in regard to its development.

Christian teaching about the life beyond is so largely symbolic, that in our case, *e.g.*, we are under no obligation to furnish particulars as to spiritual anatomy because we speak of "God's right hand," nor to offer a complete theory of spiritual metallurgy because the Bible refers to angels swinging censers. The opposite holds in regard to Spiritualism, just because it insists that its details are actually real. Yet the theory of a spiritual body in a spiritual world forms part of our Christian belief, and calls for more attention and explanation than we usually give it. Protestantism has inclined to the view of a final spiritual transformation immediately following death. But this is as severe a jolt to our religious instincts as Milton's conception of the lion appearing full grown at the word of creation or of plants suddenly coming to existence in full flower. Protestantism has effectually eliminated Indulgences, but reason clamours aloud, "Surely, not all who die are fit at once for the presence of God." The Church of England in some measure is returning unofficially to a belief in Purgatory, punitive, remedial, and educational. It is difficult not to believe that this is right.

* *Survival of Man*, by Sir O. Lodge, p. 235.

Scientists like Sir Oliver Lodge and Sir William Barrett have given their opinion that Spiritualism is a matter for the student using scientific methods of procedure. They do not advise it for ordinary people, though they think no great harm will come if reasonable precautions are taken. There are great dangers connected with it. There is the scientific danger of people uncritically supposing all communications true, and to this we may add the moral peril of people taking for spiritual revelation what is, after all, only a mirage reflected from their own subconscious selves. There is danger of some allowing their wills to be invaded by a lower order of intelligence or morality. There is danger for those who are merely curious, or who wish to perpetuate a sinful relationship. Mediums need supervision to see that no excessive drain is made on their vitality, or possible harm done to their true self-hood.

The attraction of Spiritualism consists in this: it offers actual intercourse with the departed, and actual detailed knowledge of life beyond. We will refer to this again in one moment, but, without in any degree minimizing the importance of such intercourse or such knowledge, supposing either can be proved, the most that can be said of Spiritualism is that its function would be contributory and supplementary. It could be in no sense a substitute for religion, and we oppose entirely Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's dictum that "Spiritualism *is* Religion."* Religion is more than a knowledge of the facts of existence here or in the world beyond, more than companionship with spirits still in process of growth and enlightenment. It is an intimate union between finite man and his infinite God, which transcends the power of utterance, and which must outreach human knowledge so long as man has yet to attain, and until, spiritually perfected and transformed into the fulness of God's glory, he knows even as he is known.

We cannot allow it for one moment to be assumed that what we mean by "the soul" is identical with the "psychic self" of Spiritualism, or that the word "spiritual" as used by spiritualists means for us what it means for them. St. Paul drew a distinction between the psychic or natural man (*i.e.*, the man endowed with all his natural qualities) and the spiritual man (*i.e.*, man gifted in addition with a soul and living his life in response to the promptings of God the Holy Spirit). We regard that distinction as valid, and applying it to Spiritualism we infer that man's psychic nature (for the existence of which we have increasing evidence) is as much a husk of the soul as is his physical nature. If that is so, then, as Sir William Barrett has said, "the psychical order is not the spiritual order,

* *The New Revelation*, p. 67.

for it deals . . . only with the *external*, though it be in an unseen world; and its chief value lies in the fulfilment of its work, whereby it reveals to us the inadequacy of the external, either here or hereafter, to satisfy the life of the soul."

Bearing in mind the meaning Christianity attaches to the word "spiritual," we can hardly fail to notice that the satisfaction which Spiritualism yields to its followers belongs to the order of things sensible, tangible—might we not almost say, physical? For it answers the yearning:

> "But, O, for the touch of a vanished hand
> And the sound of a voice that is still!"

The soul, sooner or later, experiences a craving for fleshly aids in most of its great ventures of faith—"Give us a sign," "Lord, show us the Father and it sufficeth us." Meanwhile never, perhaps, more than at present, has the Christian doctrine of the Communion of Saints needed to be clearly taught. The popular interest in Spiritualism at least bears some witness to the unsatisfied needs of a large number of human souls. The Christian doctrine is magnificent and strong: Christians are one in Christ and one in each other, and death is powerless to break that union. It is a living, active relationship which can be maintained and strengthened "in Sacrament and prayer." And it exists between those who are "knit together in one communion and fellowship" in the mystical body of Jesus Christ, in a bond which is eternal.

H. J. C. Matthews.

HISTORY AND RELIGION *

I remember how, when I was a Fellow of this College—as I was for seven fortunate years—and morning after morning came down the College lane to my work, I would look up at the tower over the gateway, and, dreaming first of what it must have looked like when its stones were still clean and white from the mason's chisel, would then fall to thinking about its five centuries of weathering, and to wondering what the Founder would say if he saw it, and us who were part of it, at the present day. In the course of time it became impossible for me to think of the College apart from its past; and that was my only way of understanding it. The essence of the College lay for me neither in the early apostolic days of the Founder, nor yet in these latter days in which I was living; the essence was the whole storied institution, with all that the winds had blown into it,

* A sermon delivered in the Chapel of New College, Oxford, May 7, 1922.

and the rains had washed into it, and men's minds had thought into it, for over five hundred years. I find—I suppose in virtue of many years' work as a teacher of history—that any institution in which I live has meaning for me, neither from its original design nor from its present development, but from both together, and from all that lies between both. The reading of a modern Italian philosopher has lately given me a key to my own feelings, for what I have mentioned was always rather a matter of feeling than of conscious reasoning. "All history," he writes, "is contemporary history," meaning, I suppose, that the story of the past is the exegesis of the present, and that the record of the centuries lets us see how we have come to be what we are, and what indeed we are. For the present in which we live is not a dot isolated in infinity: it is a section of a continuous line, and it has its sense and its significance through its connection with the line. No man can understand the present fully who has not seen it issuing out of the past. No man can serve an institution with a full fidelity of comprehension who has not been fed, or fed himself, on its memories. What do they know of any institution who only know its present? Institutions are what they are and also what they have been; and what they are is in very large measure what they have been.

These may seem commonplaces, and, indeed, I daresay they are. Yet how few of us are there who have lived in the past, and are therefore able to live in the full and fully comprehended present, as we ought to do. Men mostly fall into two categories: they are either unphilosophical historians—who worship the past, or some arbitrarily selected bit of the past, as if it were divine and a canon of value—or they are unhistorical philosophers, convinced that history has no standard for judging the eternal verities, and that the True, the Beautiful, and the Good exist in timeless and unchanging places. The temptation of Christian thinkers, as of other thinkers, is to fall into one or the other of these categories. At the present time it is perhaps especially their temptation to fall into the second, and to embrace, as I think that the Dean of St. Paul's embraces, a philosophy of the constant, unchanging, timeless verities, which has little room for history or for historic progress. But Christianity has to reckon with time. It is of all religions the religion for which history is most momentous. It is the religion of the continuous line. What happened in Judea 1,900 years ago is still happening to-day for the Christian—God incarnate, dying, rising—and it has always been happening ever since it happened. It is present in each present; it is the cardinal essence of every present. The past still present in the present, and therefore never past at all—this is the Christian belief.

We sing of Time as an ever-rolling stream that bears its sons away. But to the Christian time is not a stream; it is a continuous wire charged with a current running backward and forward. Along that wire the Spirit flashes and speaks; it runs and spreads light; it leaps and speeds motive power. From St. Paul to St. Augustine, from St. Augustine to Luther, we may trace the current downward; or, in the reverse way, we may hear Luther, as it were, calling to St. Augustine for light, and St. Augustine in turn appealing to St. Paul. Surely this is an historic religion, in which what happened once in time is always potent through time; in which the chain is continuous from prophet to prophet, teacher to teacher, through all the centuries. There is no other religion that has an happening in time for its eternal present. There is no other religion with so continuous a chain of tradition and illumination, in which any link—800 years, it may be, or 1,500 years, backward in time—may suddenly glow into a present meaning and glory, as the lives and the writings of Saints and Fathers can glow for us still to-day.

Our Church is therefore a present reality for us; and in the lower sense of the word present it is more than a present reality. It is the sum and series of the spiritual experience of 1,900 years. And *that* is not all. Christianity goes back beyond that. Beyond the time of our Lord's life on earth it goes back to the Greeks—back through Posidonius to the Stoics and the disciples of Plato; it goes back to the Jews—back through Gamaliel and Hillel to Jewish prophets and teachers. Some scholars will tell you that there is so much that is Greek in Christianity that Christianity is essentially Greek; others, versed in Hebrew learning, will proffer an equal claim for the Hebrew genius. Their rival zeals combine to prove one thing—that Christianity summarizes, magnetizes, compels into its orbit the thought of the world—at any rate of our Western world—throughout its known and recorded history. It is a great treasure-house in which scholars still discover old jewels that are still new. Not that I would suggest for a moment that the magnetizing of which I have spoken was indiscriminate. On the contrary, there was always a severe discrimination. The early history of Gnosticism is a sufficient proof. Gnosticism—something not unlike what we call theosophy to-day—was an attempt of old doctrines of planet-influence and soul-wandering, which were to be found in Greek mysteries and in Oriental cults, to rush into the Christian orbit; but the attempt was unsuccessful. The discriminating magnet rejected such doctrines as alien from its own pure reason and its own high moral sense of the responsibility of each human soul. But if it rejected this,

it drew the pure good there was in Plato; it drew the high solemnity of the prophets; it drew all that could feed its flame. It became in the process the purged and discriminated summary of a vast spiritual experience. Other religions—such as, perhaps, the religions of India—are also summaries. It is the special glory of Christianity that it is a purified and quintessential summary. Let us be proud of its wide and hospitable reach. To any man with the historic cast of thought it is a comforting and reassuring thing that the Church speaks with wisdom "far brought from out the storied past."

This historic wealth of Christianity has one value which it is worth while to emphasize. You know how, in the revolving of time, some aspect, some facet, some age of the past may come to stand in a close parallel with the present genius of our own time. On the secular side of our life, for instance, Greek scholars tell us to-day that there is a curious sympathy and congruity between the classic age of Greece and this age of ours, so that we may feed with a particular ease and a peculiar gain on the artistic and political and philosophic riches of the Greek past. There is a similar thing to be said of the spiritual side of our life. Out of the deep riches of spiritual experience contained in the Christian Church there may emerge, and there does emerge, age by age, some aspect, some facet, some period of the past which has a special congruity and congeniality; and the Church to-day may thus come to feed with a particular ease and a peculiar gain on the treasures of some period of its own past, now spiritually and really present again. I believe that the mediæval Church has its message for us to-day, and that we can to-day, with a peculiar sympathy, turn back to the Church of the Middle Ages, and learn from its genius and message. There is no modern work I know of such power as the section of Tröltsch's great book on the social doctrines of the Christian Churches which deals with the Middle Ages. It is for us to make again, on our new basis and under our new complexities, the great attempt which the mediæval Church made to Christianize commerce and industry. We may find its doctrine of the just price, which was supposed to be fixed for every commodity, and its prohibition of the taking of interest, impossible in our world. But they are only transitory details. What matters is the fundamental idea, that commerce and industry in a Christian community should follow Christian principle, and that there should not be an exempt sphere of business, set as it were beyond the pale, in which Christian principle ceases to be effective. And I rejoice to see at least two organizations—one mainly of business men and one mainly of clergy—addressing themselves to-day to this thorny problem, and seek-

ing in the spirit of a great bygone and yet present age of the Church to inform the business of a Christian community with Christian principle.

An historic Church is in this way like a prudent housewife; it can bring forth from its accumulated treasures things old and new. But men have thought of such a Church rather as a mother—*mater ecclesia*—a sayer of comfortable words, after a mother's manner, to the bruised and heavy-hearted. And, indeed, comfort, company, consolation—all the words beginning with that prefix "con" which signify society—these are the gifts, or the symbols of the gifts, of an historic Church. In it and by it there is a linking of hands, in a warm grasp, that is comforting, companionable, consoling. In the darkest and blackest hours we can throw ourselves back on the sociable continuity of the generations. "Be bold, my heart," says the hero in Homer, "thou hast suffered an even worse thing before." "Be comforted, my soul," the Christian will rather say to himself, "there is One Who has gone before, Who has plumbed every woe, and there is nothing I am asked to suffer which He has not suffered before." There is a comfort deep in the breast of any man who walks the way of this life in the Christian communion. It is a comfort like that of membership of a great caravan, travelling together through space and time; travelling in company, under leadership, with a guide by day and by night. He who would make his way in lonely thought—if, indeed, that can be done, for perhaps there is no such thing as lonely thought—he who would so make his way has a great loneliness upon his goings. He is face to face with the vastness of an infinite universe where the silences of unending space may terrify; where wheeling systems darken, and conceiving soars benumbed. It is no faint-heartedness which carries Christians back into the warm world of Christian companionship, and makes us gladly sing a *Te Deum* with the glorious company of the Apostles, the goodly fellowship of the Prophets, the noble army of Martyrs, the Holy Church throughout all the world. The continuous line, the Divine leadership, the linked generations, the past alive in the present, the present alive to the past —in all these things there is a large comfort of the spirit.

There is a comfort of the spirit; but is there truth? We need comfort, but we also need assurance. The deepest human passion is the passion for truth; the most solemn and sacred of human duties is the search for truth. The testimony of the ages is strong; but the resolute conscientious mind can never abandon its bounden duty of wrestling with all that it knows to find out all that it means. Such a mind commits high treason against its own sovereign if it subscribes to the pragma-

tist doctrine that truth is simply survival value—that what has endured as a belief is therefore a true belief. We should degrade Christianity if we accepted it on the basis of such a doctrine. Error has an inveterate habit of survival: truth is indeed immortal, but it is also, as it were, submersible. Let us abandon any conception of truth as consisting in a power of survival; but let us not therefore abandon the historic testimony to truth. It is thinking that finds truth; but what is thinking? It is not a lonely process: it is a social activity. No man thinks unto himself alone: he thinks by mastering the thought of others, by discussion with others, by a dialectic which throws up new considerations to fight with and take their place among all the old considerations. All thinking is a social process; each system of thought is a society of thought. Now there is this to be said for Christian thinking, that it is the longest and the most intense of the processes of thought known to history; and there is this to be said for the Christian system of thought, that it is the broadest and most inclusive society of thought which has ever been gathered together. When we find a process that runs through so many centuries; when we find a society and a system of thought which in its beginnings was able to embrace both Greek philosophy and Roman law, and age by age has been able to take count of new developments, to master new thoughts, to find a place for new considerations—surely we may say that we also find the things that make for truth. If it be thinking that finds truth, and if thought be, as I take it to be, a co-operative effort, we may justly say that the greatest and longest of all the efforts that men have made for the finding of truth is the Christian effort, and we may even venture to believe that the effort has not been unavailing. It is true, indeed, that in any process of thinking, and for any system of thought, the premiss from which it all starts is vital. If the premiss be unfounded, the process and the system will be unfounded, however long or intense the one, and however broad or inclusive the other. What is the Christian premiss? It is the premiss of a personal God, Who, as He acts in time, has also actually appeared to men in time as an incarnate Person. The historic mind will embrace the premiss, as it will welcome the historic effort of thought based on that premiss, and the result of all that effort. It will feel a congruity and consistency in the whole, and it will call that congruity and consistency the truth. Steeped in history and bound in fellowship, it will feel itself at home in the Universe. And it will be content.

There is another aspect of the historic Church which has its own deep appeal. Whatever the distinction between sacred and profane, spiritual and temporal, that Christianity may have

made, the Christian Church has always been in the world, loving the world, seeking to shape and mould the world. It has indeed had its other-worldly phases, its asceticisms, its vilifications of this world; but in its essence it has always been a force in the world, shaping the world's thought, making its action, determining its history. It is one of the glories of Christianity that it has at once left an independent secular organization and activity, and has wrought upon it and been wrought upon by it. Church and State interacting, intertwining —now antipathetic, now sympathetic, but never wholly disconnected or utterly unrelated—this has always been, for many centuries, an aspect of the history of the West. Sometimes the Church may be established, and may consecrate the State by the fact of its establishment; sometimes it may be an unestablished society, striving against the State for its own liberty—and blessing the State, even in such striving, by forcing the State to grant a general liberty, not only to the Church, but to all its groups and members. But always there has been relation; and the relation has made European history different from Asiatic history. In our own country, and with our own national Church, the intimacy of relation has been peculiarly close. The village church has been the very core and symbol of the deepest life of the English nation. That system of local self-government which has been our national peculiarity was born of the village church. The village church in our villages—it has stood there for centuries; it is the oldest, far the oldest, of all village buildings; it has watched all else change, itself in its essentials unchanged; it has gathered under its shadow, in their quiet graves, many generations of men. Take away these English village churches, remove their towers and spires, and you leave an English village—what ?

"Bare ruined choirs, where late the sweet birds sang."

May the day never come when the village post-office, becoming the symbol and office of a secularized State, takes the place of the village church as the centre and inspiration of our deep local life.

As I end these words, I am arrested by a thought which may perplex. Might not the Emperor Julian, speaking for paganism in the fourth century of our era, have pressed the historic appeal on its behalf—urged in its name its close connection with the State, consecrated by the altars of the old gods; urged in its name its old intimacies, its comprehensive power, its fellowship, its comfort ? Could he not point to Christianity as raw, new, inimical to the State and all its ordered life, divorced from history, alien from high philosophy ? And did not paganism, for all its historic appeal, perish, and Chris-

tianity, however raw, none the less conquer? And is it not dangerous, at this end of time, to argue in the spirit of a Julian for the religion which Julian sought to banish? Paganism is dead, with all its clustering history. A voice went sighing over the sea, "Pan is dead"; the poet sang of Apollo, "To earth is fallen the wondrous hall: gone is his grot, his prophetic laurel, his babbling spring: yea, quenched is even the babbling water." Can the historic appeal of Christianity save Christianity any more than it could save paganism?

Such is the thought which arrests and perplexes for the moment, but only for the moment. For there is an answer to the perplexity. The Christianity which confronted Julian was not new or raw, or unphilosophic, or unhistoric. It had done three centuries of thinking; it had struck three centuries of roots; it reached back on the one hand to the Hebrew prophets, and on the other to the Greek philosophers. It had come to an understanding with the State; in a word, it could offer all that paganism offered, and something more, something much more. Paganism, whatever historic moss it might have gathered, was not historic within. The continuous line, with the past eternally present, was not its doctrine. There *was* a rolling stream in its philosophy; the refrain of its poetry was an Alas!—alas and alas for the passing of time and the death of beauty and the ending of men!

> "Ah, though the mallow in the garden dies,
> And verdant parsley, and lush-clustering dill,
> They live again and grow in other years.
> But we, the great and mighty, we the wise,
> Once dead, unhearing in the hollow earth,
> Sleep deep a long, long, endless, wakeless sleep."

Christianity had conquered death: it had conquered time, if time be conceived in the likeness of a series of fleeting points. It knew a Christ who was in time, and is still to-day and eternally present; and in that knowledge it became a society, a fellowship, a company, voyaging through continuous time in unity, under leadership, in happiness—having a comforter, holding an assurance of truth—looking to the heavens, yet not despising the earth—remembering the past, living in the present—dead knit to living, man knit to God—the very Church of Christ, continuous still "as it was in the beginning, . . . and ever shall be."

ERNEST BARKER.

PERMANENT ELEMENTS IN PROTESTANT THEOLOGY

THE writer who undertakes at any point the defence of Protestant theology should recognize that with large classes of Englishmen—with just those classes, in fact, who constitute what we call the "reading public"—Protestantism in general is nowadays supremely unpopular. He will do well to recognize also that this unpopularity is not without cause.

The cause is, on the whole, twofold. To many religious people Protestantism stands simply for Churches devoid of adornment and services without ceremony. Men have discovered that their love of ceremony and adornment is no mere carnal weakness. They have invented the phrase that beauty is one of the forms in which God has revealed Himself, and that Protestantism in its practice has been a denial of this truth. Though phrases of this kind have been repeated, perhaps, a little too frequently, they have none the less a serious value. Beauty doubtless *is* one of the forms in which God reveals Himself, and it is seriously important that this truth should be proclaimed.

The second charge against Protestantism is graver still. Protestantism has given the impression, we are told, that religion has little to do with good conduct, at any rate with that sort of good conduct which most of us really esteem. "The working man," said Mr. Donald Hankey, describing his experience in the ranks, "does not in the least connect the things that he really believes in with Christianity. . . . This is surely nothing short of tragedy. Here were men who believed absolutely in the Christian virtues of unselfishness, generosity, charity, and humility, without ever connecting them in their minds with Christ; and at the same time what they did associate with Christianity was just on a par with the formalism and smug self-righteousness which Christ spent His whole life in trying to destroy."* He adds his opinion that the attitude of the educated man towards religion is not in this respect very different from that of his less educated neighbour.

Those who know anything of life and opinion on the Continent of Europe know well that this latter charge is brought equally against Catholicism. Thoughtful Frenchmen are just as much shocked at the importance which is attributed (by priests who have nothing much to say about the conduct of the slum landlord) to the hearing of Mass on days of obligation, as Mr. Donald Hankey is disturbed at the formalism of the

* *A Student in Arms*, second edition, p. 112.

Protestant. But Protestantism is what we are concerned with here; and for the state of things Mr. Hankey describes Protestantism in its practice is in a great measure responsible. Thus the reaction against Protestantism is, to say the least, not without excuse.

Perhaps, however, it is not too early to seek to recall ourselves to fairness of judgment. Need we, asks Bishop Gore, be always in reactions? It is difficult, no doubt, for the majority of young and enthusiastic people to be tolerant of the views of the last generation, or of the last generation but one. Yet an appeal to fairness and balanced judgment is not always without effect.

Let us begin, then, by fully admitting the supreme importance of right conduct, and the value of the lessons which the religious world has learned, directly or indirectly, from Kant. Let us admit that the only true approach to God is by submission to the Moral Law: that submission to God's will is of no religious value unless we identify God's will with the eternal law of right and wrong, the eternal truth about good and evil.

We may still maintain that Protestantism has taught principles of permanent value, and that it is by mere error that these principles are supposed to be inconsistent with the admissions just made. It is worth while to consider this assertion in relation, first, to the Protestant doctrine concerning "good works"; secondly, in relation to Protestant teaching concerning the Atonement. Protestantism, we are told, is fundamentally inconsistent with morality, since nothing can be more obviously unfair than what is implied in the Protestant doctrine of Christ's death—the punishment of the innocent for the faults of the guilty. Again, the same charge is directly supported by quotations from Luther. "It is sufficient," says Luther, "to have known the Lamb of God who takes away the sins of the world. Sin will not tear us away from Him even if we commit fornication or murder a thousand times in one day."* Indeed, the whole attitude of Protestantism to good works has seemed to many critics to be either immoral or inept. "I cannot understand," said a certain Parish Clerk, "why the Rector is always preaching against good works. There is not one in the parish!"

Still, the Protestant doctrine concerning works, and the Protestant doctrine of the Atonement, have played too great a part in the history of religion to be dismissed summarily as mere immorality or mere nonsense.

* This and similar passages will be found collected in Möhler's *Symbolik*, pp. 161, etc., edition of 1843.

We will concern ourselves here with the former doctrine only. The doctrine that "good works do not justify" is not merely Protestant or Lutheran: it is Biblical and Christian. Again, it is not merely Pauline: it is attributed in the Gospels to Jesus Himself. It is taught—even if we think that the word "justified" is a Lucan addition, due to the Evangelist's connection with St. Paul—in the parable of the Pharisee and the Publican. That gross sinners may be pardoned; that righteous persons who see no need of repentance* will fail to find pardon; these are the standing doctrines of the Synoptic Gospels. They are there taught by our Lord with an attractiveness of language which stands in curious contrast both with the words of Luther and with those of St. Paul. The Liberal Critic of to-day, when he hears the Pauline estimate of the man "who worketh not but believeth in Him that justifieth the ungodly,"† is inclined to be as severe on the Apostle as he is at other times severe on the Reformer. But when what is essentially the same doctrine is expressed with convincing gracefulness by the Founder of Christianity Himself, even the Liberal Critic sees that there is nothing immoral here.

Still, the word "justification"—by whomsoever used—gives the Liberal Critic trouble. To be "accounted righteous"‡ when he is not so really—to have righteousness "imputed"§ to him when it does not really belong to him—is not in the least what he desires. Indeed, he is inclined to say, when he is in a cynical mood, that if St. Paul is right in conceiving God as one Who "calleth things which be not as though they were"‖ at any rate this aloofness from reality attributed to God is the dominant characteristic of His worshippers.

It is clear, however, from the classical passage in the Epistle to the Romans (Rom. iv. 6-8) that the imputation of righteousness was equivalent in the mind of the Apostle to the forgiveness of sin. If the one conception is immoral, so is the other. The value of the phrase "imputed righteousness" lies in its representing forgiveness as a miracle or a paradox. A paradox forgiveness, even in its most familiar human form, undoubtedly is. We act as if there were no ground of offence though the offence has really existed. We "forgive and forget"; and yet in strictness of language the offence is not forgotten. If the memory of the offence passed out of our mind the forgiveness would pass out of our minds too. The past, then, is actually remembered, and yet the offender is treated as if it were forgotten. Again, forgiveness relates not merely to the past. We overlook present defects when they are not wilful. We

* St. Luke xv. 7. † Rom. iv. 5. See Conf. Aug. MDXL. De Fide.
‡ Gal. iii. 6. § Rom. iv. 6, 11, etc.; 2 Cor. v. 19. ‖ Rom. iv. 17.

treat them in our intercourse with the offender as non-existent. Thus, in common experience, there is between man and man an imputation of non-existing righteousness, a calling of things that are not as though they were.

It would not, indeed, be too much to say that the distinctive character of Christianity—that which differentiates it both from Judaism and from the common morality of the world—is connected with this conception of forgiveness. All the higher religions have their own distinctive methods by which man is taught to seek peace with conscience. What we may perhaps call the "natural method"—that of trying to find peace with conscience by becoming actually good—was not invented, but merely elaborated and developed, in Pharisaic Judaism. The Pharisee differs from the ordinary man of the world only in being more thorough-going and systematic. In essential principles they are the same. As against such an attempt to be justified by works the Synoptic Gospels (if we may venture to sum up their teaching in a formula) teach "justification by repentance"—that is, they teach that when repentance is sincere God overlooks actual sin, and ignores the imperfection of our achievement.

To this teaching, which judges men, not by their achievement, but by the sincerity of their inward frame of mind, Christianity has in the main been consistently faithful. There have been occasional lapses; but if any one wishes to see how great a change has been wrought by Christianity in this respect, let him contrast the ancient and the modern views of the story of Œdipus. To the coarsest, to the most ordinary, type of Christian mind the tragedy is mitigated, as it was not to the Greeks, by the reflection that Œdipus had done no wilful wrong. If this reasonable view had dominated the public mind in ancient times as it dominates the public mind now, the *Œdipus Rex* could hardly have been written.* "After all," says the modern man, "though Œdipus married his own mother, he did not *know* that she was his mother, and that makes all the difference." Thus at heart the Christian is aware, when it comes to the point, that he lives under the New Covenant, not under the Old; and he shows this knowledge even when the application is less obvious than in the case of Œdipus.

Still, there have been ages during which the *statement* of the terms upon which peace with conscience may be had has been gravely obscured. Hence the need for the Protestant

* See, *e.g.*, the magnificent speech in *Œd. Rex.*, l. 1357, etc.

Reformation; and hence the need of explanations and discussions even now.

The negative half of the doctrine—the assertion that we are not justified by good works—has been put clearly enough by St. Paul, and reaffirmed (when it sadly needed reaffirmation)* by the Reformers. Possibly both St. Paul and the Reformers were guilty of exaggeration, not only in their language but in their thoughts. Is it true that "in my flesh dwelleth no good thing"?† But the doctrine is not dependent upon the answer to this question. The real point at issue is whether our life, as it is even at its best moment, can ever be good enough to give us peace of conscience; whether our actual performance can ever satisfy the judgment of God. There may be in our actual life much that is very good. There is never ground for self-satisfaction. "Boasting," as St. Paul would say, "is excluded." The religious value of this teaching consists partly in its condemnation of the smug "self-satisfaction" spoken of by Mr. Donald Hankey. It consists partly also in its power to deliver the more wide-awake conscience from despair, from the feeling that peace with God is impossible till one has attained an unattainable standard. "I do prefer," says Bunyan,‡ "this book of Martin Luther upon the Galatians (excepting the Holy Bible) before all the books that ever I have seen, as most fit for a wounded conscience."

So much for the negative part of the doctrine of justification. The positive half has been less successfully dealt with. Though Christians have lived by it from the beginning, in primitive, in mediæval, in modern times, Christian theology has halted in its formulation of it, and it halts still. It might well seem as if the earliest statements were the best. If it is true to say that the Synoptic Gospels teach justification by repentance; if repentance (*μετάνοια*) is to be taken as referring to the future as well as to the past; if we are to be allowed to point out that the various persons whose faith is commended in the Gospels are persons who exhibit what is in essence one and the same frame of mind—a sincerity of heart which exhibits itself towards the past in repentance, towards the moral law as the teachable spirit, towards the call of the future as obedience, and so forth—it is then not too much to say that the Synoptic Gospels present—though they do not formulate—an absolutely true doctrine of justification above and beyond which we cannot get.

* *Cf.* Rashdall's *Idea of Atonement*, p. 413.

† Rom. vii. 18.

‡ *Grace Abounding to the Chief of Sinners.*

But this is not to say that the struggles to formulate the doctrine have taught us nothing. The world, no doubt, could have done better without St. Paul and Luther than without the Synoptic Gospels. There are, nevertheless, many of us who owe our souls to St. Paul and to the Lutheran interpretations of his teaching. To such men " faith " is an important term, because part of what they wish to maintain is the paradox that a man's inward state may be right while his external conduct is very imperfect. We need here, no doubt, the warning of Hegel,* that this distinction between " inward " and " outward "—this reliance upon the " excellent intentions of the inner self "—may give rise to vain pretensions. But a compensatory warning is needed also. At times when—far from relying on the excellence of our intentions—we are rather discouraged by the poverty of our achievement, we need most of all to be told that neither the heinousness of our past offences nor the continuing corruptness of our nature is a proof of our condemnation, or an obstacle to Divine forgiveness. Here the very violence of Luther's language may beget the conviction which more temperate phraseology would not produce: " Esto peccator et pecca fortiter: sed fortius fide et gaude in Christo. Peccandum est quamdiu hic sumus. Si gratiæ prædicator es, gratiam non fictam sed veram prædica: si vera gratia est, verum non fictum peccatum ferto. Deus non facit salvos ficte peccatores."

It may be objected that it is not the rhetorical but the doctrinal passages in Luther which are most worthy of blame. When Luther speaks of a Christian who might commit a thousand murders in one day, he is obviously using the language of rhetoric. In a less rhetorical context, however, he denies that the faith which saves is faith which involves charity. The justifying faith according to him is the *fides non formata*. Luther, it appears, will not for a moment hear of moral goodness of any kind as having anything to do with the justification of man before God.

To explain Luther's attitude in this matter there are two possible theories. We might conceive of Luther as resembling the simple-minded David Deans in Scott's *Heart of Midlothian*, who is so entirely convinced of the supreme importance of orthodox belief that, while he takes infinite precautions that his daughter on leaving home shall be protected against hereti-

* *Encyclopædia of Philosophic Sciences: Doctrine of Essence*, 140. Hegel's remarks here deserve to be better known than they are. Probably one reason for the surprising success of the novel *If Winter Comes* is that the description of the hero gratifies the vanity of that large class of persons who know that they are ineffective, and believe that they are misunderstood. The epigram that " the only real selfishness is selfishness of the mind " (*If Winter Comes*, p. 35) is capable of a very sinister application.

cal opinions, he never thinks of guarding her against the more pressing danger of moral seduction. Such cases have been common enough in real life. A man may act in this manner for two reasons. Either he may believe that so long as one is fortified by orthodox belief the temptations of the world will have no power; or he may be consciously or unconsciously an antinomian—that is, he may think that so long as orthodox belief is maintained it is no great matter whether we resist temptations or yield to them. Now it is clear that Luther is not among those who think that the man who is orthodox, even upon what is to him the central article of the faith, will not sin. Thus, if in Luther's mind salvation by faith is equivalent to salvation by orthodoxy, then Luther is quite frankly an antinomian. It is as an occasional antinomian—a man antinomian in his theories, but saved from practical antinomianism by his inconsistency of thought and rough goodness of heart—that Luther appears in the striking and not unsympathetic sketch drawn recently by the Dean of Carlisle.*

That Luther, like other men, was often inconsistent with himself we shall all willingly admit. That Luther often used the language of exaggeration is quite obvious. But it does not seem very likely that Luther had thought out as imperfectly as the Dean's sketch suggests the doctrine which was the centre both of his teaching and of his own religion. Perhaps, then, we ought to seek a different explanation: such an explanation as seems indeed to be furnished by what we know of Luther's religious history.

The experience of Luther is in some respects parallel with that of St. Paul. Luther had seen men seeking salvation by "works," sometimes by external works (such as pilgrimages) of an obviously trivial and futile sort.† To men of sensitive conscience the recommendation of these "puerile and unnecessary works" had been a burden, and even the fulfilment of these works had brought no "consolation." St. Paul had found himself equally dissatisfied with the Pharisaic methods. In St. Paul and in Luther a change of *method* had been accompanied —and (in their own opinion) caused—by a change of *belief*. If the modern Christian is right in interpreting their experience

* *The Idea of Atonement.* See, *e.g.*, p. 409 onwards; *cf.* pp. 413, 416, 420. Dr. Rashdall's work, taken as a whole, is beyond all praise. But is it unfair to suggest that he misjudges Luther, partly because he is himself blind to the element of paradox which is involved in all forgiveness as such (see above, p. 30 and *cf. Idea of Atonement*, p. 405), and still more because he does not understand, as Bunyan understood, why the belief that love is the central element in the state of mind which brings justification is so distressing to a wounded conscience ?

† Cf. Conf. Aug. MDXXXI.: XX. Tantum puerilia et non necessaria opera urgebant, ut certas ferias, certa jejunia, fraternitates, peregrinationes, cultus sanctorum, rosaria, monachatum et similia.

by his own, the change from unhappiness under the Law to freedom under the Gospel—from the sense of bondage which belonged to Luther in unreformed Christianity to the liberty he gained under the Reformation—was due primarily to a change of will and not to a change of doctrine. A will confused by the multitude of demands made by the older system is enabled to choose clearly when simple allegiance to Christ is set before it as the one object of its choice. But, just as in St. Paul's case, this allegiance had been contemporary with a new-found belief in Christ's Resurrection, so in Luther's case it had come about through a new conception—new at least to himself—of the efficacy of Christ's death. Thus it is natural enough that St. Paul should have annexed salvation to the belief that God had raised Christ from the dead,* and that Luther should have annexed it to belief that Christ died for our sins. Their error (if error there was)† lies in their assuming that the experience of others must be just like their own: in the assumption—not merely that the moral change which brings decisive peace with conscience is inseparable from Christian discipleship (an assumption in which Christians of many varied schools will agree with them), but rather that this change of heart is inseparable from the particular doctrines which had produced the spiritual revolution in themselves. There is no evidence that either the Apostle or the Reformer would have seriously regarded a purely doctrinal belief as a "justifying faith," whatever they may say in their more rhetorical moments; and there is much evidence against any such conclusion.

When Luther, then, refuses to admit that our love plays any part in our justification, this (we may suggest) is not because he undervalues love,‡ but because for him "justifica-

* Rom. x. 9. If this passage were taken quite literally—if we interpreted it to mean that men were justified by mere belief in Christ's resurrection "apart from works"—we should have here as antinomian a text as any that can be found in Luther.

† Is it certain that there was any error here at all except in inexactness of expression? If St. Paul, or Luther, had been confronted with a sincere penitent of a type now common—a man Christian in his moral judgments and volitions, but unorthodox on the Atonement and the Resurrection—is it certain that they would have hesitated even for a moment to admit that such a one was justified by faith? It is clear that when they speak of justifying faith they both have in mind something different from such mere doctrinal belief as might exist in us without making any change in our moral attitude. Rom. x. 9 must be interpreted by the phrase "unto righteousness" in x. 10. *Cf.* Luther on Gal. iii. 11. He says of the faith which "renews not nor changes the heart," which "generates not the new man, but leaves man in his former sentiments and conversation," that this is "really no faith." *Cf.* on Gal. ii. 16: "Christ *apprehended by faith*, and *dwelling in the heart* is the true Christian righteousness." Such a faith—such an indwelling of Christ—is obviously conceived by Luther as affecting the will and the whole moral attitude and temper.

‡ On Gal. iii. 10: "To do is first of all to believe, and so through faith perform the law. We must first receive the Holy Ghost, wherewith we, being lightened and made new creatures, begin to do the law—that is to say, to love God and our neighbours. . . . When they (believers) have taken hold upon Christ by faith, the Holy Ghost is given unto them for His sake. Then do they love God and their neigh-

tion by love" is equivalent to "justification by law,"*—that is, "by works." Similarly, when Luther asserts justification by faith, this is not because he thinks orthodoxy superior to holiness, but because with him it was a new belief in Christ which had wrought the great change of heart which he describes, and because he cannot conceive that apart from belief in Christ similar to his own the requisite change of heart can come to anyone.

If, therefore, we ask what value we are to attribute to Protestant teaching concerning faith and works, we may answer that both in its positive and in its negative aspects it possesses importance for religion.

On its negative side it leads us to surrender the hope of being justified by our own achievements—an extremely natural hope, yet a hope which in the end can only bring the awakened soul to despair. It is here well worth while to remember that Kant is as strongly opposed to "justification by love" as is Luther himself. In his well-known distinction between the "practical love and the pathological liking," in his statement that "love, as an affection, cannot be commanded," that "reason makes self-esteem depend on morality," and "thus the moral law casts down all self-conceit," that "the whole morality of an act" must "be put in the necessity of it, out of duty and reverence for the law, not in love and inclination towards what may be consequent upon the act," Kant, in spite of great differences of terminology and of outlook, is expressing a view which, in its estimate of love and of good works, is in essential agreement with Luther's.

On its positive side, too, Luther's teaching is more in accord than we are at first inclined to suspect with the lessons which the modern world has learned from the Kantian ethics. Kant —if we may translate his teaching into the *argot* of theology— asserts "justification by good will," a doctrine extremely similar to, and perhaps quite identical with, that "justification by repentance" which we have found—unformulated but implied —in the Synoptic Gospels. Now it is clear that Luther's "faith," as he conceived it, contained in it an *active* element,

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bours, then do they good works, then do they carry the cross patiently. This is to do the law indeed; otherwise the law remaineth always undone." *Cf.* on Gal. iii. 22: "When we are out of the matter of justification, we cannot enough praise and extol those works which God has commanded." *Cf.* on Gal. ii. 17: "We dispute not now whether good works are to be done . . . but our dispute and question now is concerning justification, whether the law justifies. . . . In its own time we shall handle this subject, that the law and good works must be done; but here, when we are on the subject of justification, we cast away good works, which our adversaries very tenaciously hold, and ascribe justification to them; which is to take away the glory from Christ and give it to works.

* On Gal. iii. 12: "The law is not of faith." Luther asks: "What is the law? Is it not even the precept of love?"

an element of *volition*. He blames the Roman teaching because, "according to the pestilent figment of the Sophists" (*i.e.*, the Schoolmen), "faith is a mean virtue, some unformed chaos, of no *energy*, *efficacy*, and *life*, but *only* a *passive substance*."* This passage must be borne in mind when we read his assertion that Christian righteousness is "passive and not active."†

Luther again distinguishes between "feigned" faith and "true." "The feigned is that which hears of God, of Christ, and of all the mysteries of incarnation and redemption, and understands them when heard, and knows how to speak of them very beautifully, and yet it is a mere notion and a vain hearing, which hears only a hum of the Gospel in the heart, of which it prattles much; it is, however, really no faith, for it renews not, nor changes the heart.‡ . . . And this faith is most pernicious, which it would be better not to have. Even the moral philosopher is better than the hypocrite, who has this faith." Thus sincerity and a changed heart are, for Luther, the real tests of a true faith.§

That the faith which he regards as true has its doctrinal side we must admit. It is a faith which "doubts not respecting God, nor the Divine promises, nor the remission of sins by Christ." But to judge Luther fairly we must remember the difference between his age and our own. For us the familiar antithesis is between judgments of value and judgments of fact, or between right *will* and orthodox *belief*. Luther's chief dread is lest as a test of sincerity men should ask, "Do I love? Do I do good works?"‖ For minds such as he had in view the question, "Do I maintain my faith in God's mercy through Christ?" may well be the best test available. Under any system of self-examination, of course, there are great possibilities of self-deception. But for those in whom a new religious belief has wrought a revolutionary change in moral attitude the

* On Gal. iii. 11: "Further, the subverters of Christ's Gospel say that even infused faith, which is not received by hearing, nor acquired by any other work, but which the Holy Spirit creates in man, consists with mortal sin, and that the worst of men may possess it, and that if it be alone, it is inactive and useless, though it may work miracles. Thus they wholly take away from faith its own office, and ascribe it to love: so that faith avails nothing, unless its mould, love, be added. Then according to this pestilent figment," etc., as above.

† On Gal. i. 2.

‡ On Gal. iii. 11. For the rest of the passage see note †, p. 32. *Cf.* on Gal. iii. 10: "Thus the unclean herd think that righteousness is a moral thing, looking only on the outward work, not on the heart of the doer of the work; when yet even in philosophy they are forced to regard, not the naked work, but the good intention of the worker."

§ *Cf.* Conf. Aug. MDXL. De bonis operibus. Nec existere fides potest, nisi n his qui poenitentiam agunt.

‖ A phrase of Dr. Rashdall's (*Atonement*, p 414) suggests that he might admit as a test-question: "Do I show signs of moral *improvement?*" To a person of scrupulous and introspective temperament a more dangerous question, surely, could hardly be proposed.

maintenance of their belief is commonly an evidence that the new moral attitude is maintained also. There are, no doubt, cases in which a doctrinal belief may be morally and spiritually worthless. An English peasant of the Middle Ages might find it as easy to believe in the Resurrection of Christ as to believe in the eruption of Vesuvius.* Both were to him marvels; both were accepted on hearsay. For him the two beliefs might be equally easy and, as tests of his spiritual condition, equally unimportant. But for Luther the belief in God's free grace, for St. Paul the belief in Christ's Resurrection—beliefs late won and won hardly—were beliefs with a personal application, and therefore beliefs not easy to maintain apart from a real surrender of will to the God whose power and love they believed to be thus exhibited. The place which such belief occupied in their minds is best understood by reference to the place which similar beliefs have occupied in modern Evangelical experience. Confident assurance of one's own future salvation, for example, may, no doubt, be sometimes a piece of merely fanatical presumption. Yet it is probable that such assurance has seldom existed in any sincere mind without a basis of such genuine repentance as affords a valid ground for certainty of present pardon and present reconciliation with God.

Such comparisons are, to say the least, not irrelevant. For, if we once admit that the Protestant doctrine of good works is the product neither of pure antinomian sentiment nor of sheer mental confusion, are we not then compelled to seek for some such general explanation of its religious significance as is here suggested ?†

CHARLES J. SHEBBEARE.

* The literary allusions to burning mountains in medieval writers (see, *e.g.*, Dante and John of Salisbury) seem to be chiefly to Ætna. But several eruptions of Vesuvius are alleged between the eleventh and sixteenth centuries.

† The following passage from Luther's Commentary on Gal. iii. 10 serves to illustrate the extracts quoted above: "In philosophy they [the schoolmen] grant that a work morally right is not good, except there be first a right judgment of reason and a good will or a good intent. So then they will have a right judgment of reason and a good intent to go before the work—*i.e., they make the person morally righteous before the work.* Contrariwise, in divinity and in spiritual matters, *where they ought most of all to do so*, they . . . pervert and turn all quite contrary, placing the work *before right judgment of reason and good intent.* . . . In divinity . . . this word 'doing' must have a new significance, and be used in a new sense, joined with a right judgment of reason and a good will, not morally, but divinely: which is, that I know and believe by the word of the Gospel that God hath sent His Son into the world to redeem us from sin and death. . . . In divinity we have no other right judgment of reason, no good will or intent, besides faith."

MISCELLANEA

NOTES AND COMMENTS

The Rev. A. E. Alston writes:

"Dr. Gummey suggests that as early as 230, and perhaps earlier, the current liturgy contained a developed 'Thanksgiving for creation and redemption . . . flowing easily . . . into the commemoration of Christ's Death and Resurrection and the Invocation of the Holy Ghost.' It may be questioned whether a prayer that the Holy Spirit may *come and rest upon this oblation* accords with the theology of the third century —it savours strongly of the latter part of the fourth—but the prevailing theory of the construction of the Thanksgiving is, I venture to think, also open to doubt. The sequence of commemoration and invocation is by no means obvious, and to say that the thanksgiving concludes easily and naturally with an invocation of the Holy Spirit, or may be expected so to conclude, amounts to saying that this is the meaning and object of the thanksgiving, that thanks are given with the ultimate view of invoking the Holy Spirit. This would seem to lead nowhere. What is needed at the present stage is an investigation of the origin of the thanksgiving itself. Was it originally liturgical—*i.e.*, part and parcel of the sacramental rite? Or was it, in origin, anything more than the conclusion of the meal that preceded that rite—grace after supper? And if not, what becomes of the 'apostolic anaphora'?"

We are glad that the authorities of the National Assembly have published as a pamphlet (price 1d., or 7s. 6d. a thousand) the speech delivered by the Archbishop of Canterbury at the February Group of Sessions on the education question. As His Grace says, "The liability we suffer from is that other people, who will not challenge [our] principles as a whole, will challenge the way in which they say we are trying to carry them out"; and he asks them, therefore, to say how they propose to apply them. The same difficulty meets us in regard to Reunion: formulæ of agreement can be drawn up; the difficulty is to translate them into common action.

Arrangements have been made for the publication in our September number of the papers read at the recent Anglo-Catholic Congress held at Leeds. We believe that this remarkable movement—at once practical and theological—will be better represented by the papers of one Congress, which necessarily express an underlying unity of idea, than by a selection of papers from different Congresses. At the same time the Editor will be glad to consider any other similar papers which may be sent to him for publication.

A friend has written with regard to our note in the June issue on the subject of liturgical revision. We did not wish to be understood as deprecating the *private* use by the priest, when celebrating, of prayers from the Roman Canon or any other source. As our correspondent says, "The good Evangelical, no doubt, makes use of, more or less extempore, prayers said silently during the course of the service. Why should not we do the same, but using prayers far better put together and with some regard to liturgical order?" But that was not our point. Our point was the necessity of finding agreement as to the *structure* of the rite, and the order of its *public* parts. The "Canterbury Canon," advocated

by Father Trenholme, seems to us to provide such a structure; and, while in itself good and sound, there is nothing in it which should make it difficult of general acceptance in the Church. As we go to press the final report of the National Assembly's Committee on Prayer-Book Revision reaches us, and we rejoice to see that the main changes which Father Trenholme pleaded for have been incorporated.

IN THE STUDY

By Rev. W. K. Lowther Clarke, B.D., Edit. Sec. of S.P.C.K.

ADVICE ON BOOKS

If readers who require advice on courses of theological study or the choice of books care to write to the Editorial Department of S.P.C.K., an attempt will be made to give them the required information. Sixpence in stamps should be sent to cover the cost of the necessary correspondence. It will frequently be necessary to refer the enquiry to an expert; a number of well-known scholars have consented to help in this way. Sometimes, especially in the summer months, there may be a little delay in answering. The Editor reserves the right to publish answers if they are of sufficient general interest. In such cases the initials of the correspondents will be given.

STUDIES IN TEXTS

[Under this heading we hope to give simple explanations of New Testament passages intended for the non-specialist reader. Special attention will be paid to those passages where the R.V. rendering is not universally accepted by present-day scholars.]

St. Matthew v. 22: *Whosoever is angry with his brother without a cause shall be in danger of the Judgment.*

The R.V. omits "without a cause," retaining it in the margin. We hope to show that this is one of the many instances in which the present policy of the University Presses, which insist that the R.V. shall not be printed without the marginal readings, is justified. Most textual problems interest the scholar only, but this is of great practical importance. Did our Lord condemn anger in this absolute fashion? If so, the pacificist position is strongly reinforced.

It must be confessed that modern scholars are nearly unanimous in supporting the R.V.

1. The Westcott and Hort text, based as it is on the oldest Greek codices, still holds the field in English-speaking countries.

2. If our Lord spoke absolutely and uncompromisingly it was just what we should expect from His methods on other occasions. The aim of a religious teacher must often be to startle hearers. They will be ready enough to blur the sharp outlines of his precepts by compromises and concessions. Besides, the A.V. reading is tame and unworthy. "Whoever justified uncalled-for anger? We may know little of the teaching of Jesus, but it was certainly free from platitude" (*The Beginnings of Christianity*, i. 284).

Let us consider these two arguments:

1. *The Textual Evidence.*—Broadly speaking, the "Western" text and the later Textus Receptus have the words, as have Irenæus and Cyprian among early Fathers. It is absent in ℵ and B (the two great early codices on which Westcott and Hort based their text), Origen, Eusebius, Basil, and the Vulgate. To these authorities Justin Martyn and Tertullian are generally added. But the actual quotation in Justin (*Apol.* i. 16) is, "Whosoever shall be angry is in danger of the fire." The first and last words of the passage are quoted, and there can be no certainty that "without cause" was unknown to Justin. Tertullian does not quote the words, but his phrasing in *On Prayer*, c. 11, seems to imply them. "How will he who is angry with his brother appease his Father, seeing that all wrath has from the beginning been forbidden us? . . . Then the Lord, manifestly enlarging the law, puts wrath against one's brother into the same category as murder." But apart from Justin and Tertullian, the remaining evidence, impressive though it seems at first sight, need not mean more than that a good Egyptian type of text omitted "without cause." Sinaiticus and Vaticanus (ℵ and B) are one authority rather than two; Origen is Egyptian; Eusebius and Basil have close affinities with Origen; and the Vulgate is the earlier Latin version revised with the help of old Greek MSS. closely akin to ℵ and B. Now many scholars are inclined to doubt the primitive character of these two MSS. Probably they represent the purest type of text obtainable, but is not this in all probability a scholarly revision undertaken at Alexandria in the third century? The Coptic versions have the disputed words, so the earliest Greek MSS. in Egypt probably had them also.

2. *Intrinsic Probability.*—Is it likely that Christ, Who "looked round about on them with anger" (Mark iii. 5) condemned all anger as wrong without qualification? Anger is ascribed to Him only in the Second Gospel. The same feeling of reverence which led the First and Third Evangelists to omit any references to Christ's anger may well in another connection have brought about the sharpening of the prohibition against anger by the omission of the words "without cause." The argument that our Lord would not have uttered a platitude is valueless. What could be more obvious than Matt. vii. 17, "Every good tree bringeth forth good fruit: but the corrupt tree bringeth forth evil fruit"? but we cannot doubt its genuineness on this account. Our Lord surely never shrank from saying a true thing because it was obvious.

If we accept the A.V. as best representing our Lord's meaning there are two solutions open to us:

Either (*a*) He did not use the words "without cause," but the disciples, knowing His mind, rightly took anger to mean anger "without cause"; and at a very early period the insertion was made as a true gloss, lest the real meaning should be lost. Or (*b*)—a conclusion to which I incline—the critical school of Alexandria in the third century excised the words. It was a time when the Church was trying to come to terms with philosophy. The ideal man in the eyes of Hellenistic and Christian philosopher alike was the "apathes," the man without passions. The Alexandrian critics brought the text of the passage into line with modern thought by omitting a phrase which, so it seemed, blunted the point of Christ's words.

BOOKS ON PSYCHOLOGY AND CHRISTIANITY

A University lecturer in Psychology sends us the following list of books suitable for students of Psychology from the Christian standpoint :

The Varieties of Religious Experience. James.
The Mystical Element of Religion. Von Hügel.
The Religious Consciousness. Pratt. (Much the best book on the subject.)
The Psychology of Religion. Leuba. (This is dogmatically anti-religious and tends to be superficial, but gives a fair general outline of the subject.)
The Psychology of Mystical Experience. Howley. (The author is a Roman Catholic. His psychology is rather out of date.)

DOCUMENT

THE REPLY OF THE BISHOPS OF THE CHURCH OF SWEDEN

To the Conference of Bishops in the Anglican Communion.

(See Resolutions 24 and 25 of the Lambeth Conference, 1920.)

With deep and sincere satisfaction we have received the resolution adopted by the Conference of Bishops of the Anglican Communion, holden at Lambeth in London during the summer 1920, wherein this Conference recommends that members of the Swedish Church, qualified to receive the Sacrament in their own Church, should be admitted to Holy Communion in the Anglican Church, as well as that on suitable occasions permission should be given to Swedish ecclesiastics to give addresses in churches belonging to the Anglican Communion. That the Lambeth Conference, after long and thoroughgoing negotiations which have taken place in this matter during recent years, now for its own part has found the time come for a closer connection between the two Churches of such a kind as from its most important feature might be characterized as intercommunion, this is to us a source of real joy, because we see therein a step towards that great goal for which we pray and strive with you: that the unity which has always existed and exists between all true disciples of Christ, should be better realized than hitherto also in external matters, and also because of the direct and practical importance, which such a connection must have for the work to which our Church is called, for the pastoral task which is imposed upon her by the Lord of the Church even for those of its members who live outside the borders of their own country, and thus also and particularly for those who live within the British Empire.

The question of the terms of Communion between two

Churches has not been the object of general discussions and resolutions among us to the same extent as among you, for reasons which will appear from the following pages. But from the practice which has been followed hitherto in this matter by our Church, these two principles might be drawn: (1) To individual members of foreign Communions who have desired more occasionally to take part in Holy Communion in our Church for the strengthening of their inner life, this right has been conceded as a duty of charity. A refusal of this right in such cases, *in casu necessitatis*, will hardly have occurred in our Church. (2) A concession of this right *in genere* to the members of a certain Communion, on the other hand, presupposes that an essential agreement, proved by the confessional documents of the Communion in question, exists as regards the spirit and the main points of Christian faith. In the case of those Communions which, like our own, have accepted the *Confessio Augustana*, the concession of such general intercommunion has been considered as quite natural, while in other cases the matter has been thought to demand a particular inquiry. But that the direct acceptance of the *Confessio Augustana* has not been considered in all cases as the necessary condition for the concession of intercommunion is shown also by the fact, which has a particular interest in this case, that already once before, from the seventeenth century, intercommunion of this kind has existed in North America between our Church and yours. Two centuries later, during some years after 1866, Swedish emigrants to the United States were recommended to the Protestant Episcopal Church in such places where there was no access to a Swedish Evangelical Lutheran Community.*

Thus, in the question of intercommunion our Church has not attached decisive weight either to the doctrine of the ministry in general or to what is usually called the Apostolical Succession of Bishops and the questions thereby implied. The deeper reason for this is derived from our fundamental conceptions, and has been explained several times during the preparatory investigations and particularly during the negotiations in Upsala in September, 1909, by the representatives

* In the circular letter of the Clerus Comitialis to the clergy from the Diet of 1865–66, it was recommended that a testimonial to this effect should be given to emigrants. Amongst the reasons for this it is said "that a Bishop of the English Episcopal Church in the United States, now present in our capital, has given us the kindest assurances that such of our countrymen as go to places where there are no Evangelical Lutheran Communities, may be sure to find necessary assistance in matters spiritual as well as temporal at the hands of the clergy of the English Church, if they choose to apply to them, without the slightest attempt being made by the English Church to imbue them with other doctrines than those which our Church confesses, or to separate them in any respect from this Church."

of the Swedish Church. For the explanation of this position, which we think that we ought also now to emphasize, we refer to the points with regard to the doctrine of the Swedish Church on the ministry that were on that occasion laid before the Committee appointed by the Archbishop of Canterbury in 1909, and form part of the report issued in 1911 by this Committee. From these points we quote:

"3. No particular organization of the Church and of its ministry is instituted *jure divino*, not even the order and discipline and state of things recorded in the New Testament, because the Holy Scriptures, the *norma normans* of the faith of the Church, are no law, but vindicate for the New Covenant the great principle of Christian freedom, unweariedly asserted by St. Paul against every form of legal religion, and applied with fresh strength and clearness by Luther, but instituted by our Saviour Himself, as, for instance, when, in taking farewell of His disciples, He did not regulate their future work by *a priori* rules and institutions, but directed them to the guidance of the Paraclete, the Holy Ghost.

"4. The object of any organization and of the whole ministry being included in the preaching of the Gospel and the administration of the sacraments—according to the fifth article of the *Augustana*, God has instituted *ministerium docendi evangelii et porrigendi sacramenta*—our Church cannot recognize any essential difference, *de jure divino*, of aim and authority between the two or three Orders into which the ministry of grace may have been divided, *jure humano*, for the benefit and convenience of the Church.

"5. The value of every organization of the *ministerium ecclesiasticum*, and of the Church in general, is only to be judged by its fitness and ability to become a pure vessel for the supernatural contents, and a perfect channel for the way of Divine Revelation unto mankind.

"6. That doctrine in no wise makes our Church indifferent to the organization and the forms of ministry which the cravings and experiences of the Christian Community have produced under the guidance of the Spirit in the course of history. We do not only regard the peculiar forms and traditions of our Church with the reverence due to a venerable legacy from the past, but we realize in them a blessing from the God of history accorded to us."

From the conception of our Church regarding the ministry which has been declared here again, it follows that for us decisive importance must be attached, not to any questions of a more formal character, but to the question whether and how far the two Communities agree in these ideas as to the

content of that message of salvation, founded on the Divine revelation, which has been committed to both of them. The differences which no doubt can be found here must be neither overrated nor underrated. The difference as to the emphasis laid on the doctrine of ministry, which has appeared above, might point to a certain discrepancy even in matters that have a more central position according to our valuation. Another point which presents itself to the mind when the question of intercommunion is raised, is the difference which, according to the confessions of both Churches, exists in their conception of the Lord's Supper itself. The judgment of the extent of this difference is made more difficult by the fact, which has appeared also during the preparatory negotiations, that evidently within the Anglican Church itself different doctrines are held in these two questions.

Yet, and without any wish to belittle the difference that exists between the two Churches, we do not hesitate to pronounce as our opinion that during the course of the preparatory negotiations and so far as we have gradually got to know more about the Anglican Church, our impression of that unity which binds the two Churches together in what is deepest and most central has become predominant. In the Church and the congregation of Christ, as in every living body, real concord is not characterized by uniformity, but by unity in diversity. A detailed definition of those matters in which this concord appears cannot be attempted here. But yet we do not feel justified in pretermitting briefly to call attention to two points, which are to us more decisive than all others, with regard to the purity of the Christian doctrine—viz., the recognition of Scripture as *norma normans* both with regard to life and doctrine, and the building of our salvation on God's grace alone received by faith.

The first of those principles means to us that in matters of faith no other authority must be put directly or indirectly above or, which is the same thing, on a level with the prophetic and apostolic word in Holy Scripture, as the message preserved to us of the works of God for the salvation of man in that history of salvation, wherein the all-commanding centre which everything else presages or points back to is Jesus Christ. The prophetic and apostolic message has sprung out of the revelation of God Himself and is itself a part of this revelation. All later expressions of Christian faith, however great their value may be, are to be considered only as more or less reliable guides to or, in the words of the *Formula Concordiæ*, "witnesses" of this revelation, witnesses whose verdicts must always be tested, by the experience of the Church and of the

individual Christian, in the light of the revelation itself, which is recorded, confessed, and interpreted in the prophetic and apostolic message, and is thus accessible to us alone.

When we put beside the principle of revelation the principle of faith or grace, this is at bottom not another principle by the side of the first, but we mean only thereby to make the content of revelation more clear from a certain point of view. The revelation is throughout essentially a revelation of God's prevenient and unconditional grace, precedent and independent of all human endeavour—that is, a revelation of the love of God, which, while condemning sin, searches for the sinner and restores him with His forgiveness. What we want to express by this is not only one, not even the most central, of those Christian doctrines which have grown out of the Divine revelation, but the fundamental direction and meaning of God's whole activity for salvation, whereby He has revealed Himself to us, and has, in spite of our sin, opened to us in Jesus Christ His paternal bosom. The revelation has no other meaning that could be put on a level with this: everything else that we derive from it is only a consequence of this. And when we combine the grace of God and the faith of man in a close connection, we mean only to determine thereby more fully the nature of prevenient grace against all pelagianizing tendencies. Faith means to us, not something which man has to do that might precede and be a condition of God's grace and remission of sins, but faith is only that ὄργανον ληπτικόν which is created by God's grace, and whereby God's grace is received by man: out of the revelation of God's love in Christ Jesus our trust in this love is born and by that it is sustained. The new moral life is a fruit of this communion with God, which has been opened to us independently of any works of man. Our moral life is not the condition of and does not sustain our religious relationship to God, but it is rather conditioned and sustained thereby. "Good works" are, to speak with Luther, not the condition of blessedness, but that blessedness which is prepared for us in spite of our sin, when we are called to be the children of God, is the condition without which "good works" cannot be done at all. That those two principles which we began by discerning in this letter are fundamentally one is made still more manifest by contemplating the opposites, which are denied by them. If the principle of revelation turns in the first place against any form of institutionalism and legalism (nomism), the principle of faith or of grace has primarily in view all sorts of pelagianism. But then institutionalism, nomism, and pelagianism are only different aspects of that one fundamental conception which is

totally denied by us. Both principles could be most simply combined in this: Between God and the soul, or which is the same to us, between Christ and the faith, nothing, no third principle, no institution, no law, no proper works must intervene.

The same conception is contained in its outlines, so far as we have been able to see, partly in the sixth, partly in the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth of the Thirty-nine Articles.

We are convinced that between our branches of the Universal Church of Christ, notwithstanding the shades of opinion that may exist, there is an essential unity in that fundamental conception which we have now briefly indicated, and to which we unswervingly adhere. In this conviction we accept with fraternal confidence the outstretched hand. We rejoice at the decision of the Anglican Bishops, and on our side we approve of the practice that members of the Anglican Communion, qualified to receive the Sacrament in their own Church, should be admitted to Holy Communion in our Church, as well as that on suitable occasions permission should be given to Anglican ecclesiastics to give addresses in our churches and there to perform religious functions.

To this general answer we ought to add a few words about some special questions, mentioned in the resolutions of the Lambeth Conference and in the report of a Special Committee, by which the resolutions were prepared:

1. With regard to Resolution 25 of the Conference, where it is recommended that in the event of an invitation being extended to an Anglican Bishop or Bishops to take part in the consecration of a Swedish Bishop, the invitation should, if possible, be accepted, subject to approval of the Metropolitan, we express our satisfaction that a wish, expressed by the Archbishop of Canterbury in a letter of August 11, 1920, to the Archbishop of Upsala, when communicating to him the Lambeth resolutions—viz., that for the future a reciprocal assistance of Bishops from one of the Churches at the consecration of Bishops in the other might be practised when a suitable occasion presents itself—has now already begun to be put into practice by the assistance of two Anglican Bishops at the consecration of two Swedish Bishops in Upsala on September 19, 1920. We recommend, further, that in case such an invitation to take part in the consecration of an Anglican Bishop should be extended to a Swedish Bishop, it should, if possible, be accepted, subject to the approval of the Archbishop.

2. The Committee appointed by the Lambeth Conference to report on these questions gives expression in its report to two desiderata which were discussed already in the preliminary

negotiations in Upsala in September, 1909. They concern, firstly, the establishment in the Church of Sweden of a Diaconate of the same kind as that existing in the Anglican Communion; and, secondly, the introduction, likewise in accordance with the Anglican practice, of the laying-on of hands as an outward sign of grace given in Confirmation.

With regard to these two desiderata, which, as we notice, have neither now nor formerly been made in any way conditional for intercommunion, we wish to make the following brief statements:

(*a*) In our Church we do not now possess any Order exactly corresponding to the Anglican Diaconate. For a number of years, however, we have had among us a male Diaconate for the service of charity among the sick, the infirm, the poor, the lost, thus of the same character as the Diaconate of women, which is older and more amply developed among us. In Resolution 49 of the Lambeth Conference, this Diaconate is said to be the primitive one in the Christian Church, a statement which is undoubtedly true according to Acts vi. No need of or wish for a Diaconate as an introduction to the ministry has been expressed in our Church.

(*b*) The question about laying-on of hands in Confirmation has, in our opinion, decidedly the character of an *adiaphoron*. Consequently, we have no scruples against the use of this beautiful rite, which is practised in our Church on other occasions; on the other hand, we cannot accept it if supported by arguments that would in any way question its character of an *adiaphoron*.

In this connection we do not feel justified in pretermitting to draw your attention to the very great importance that our Church attaches to the thorough instruction of the first communicants in the fundamentals of the Christian faith, as being an indispensable condition for Confirmation—a requirement that does not seem to be paid the same attention to in the Anglican practice of Confirmation. Against the admission to the Lord's Supper in our Church of persons confirmed in the Anglican Church, hesitation has earlier been expressed among us because of the duty of instruction laid on the Church in Matt. xxviii. 20. Nevertheless, this has not prevented admission to Holy Communion in our Church for those confirmed in the Anglican Church. We are of opinion that both Churches may have something to learn from each other, both with regard to the preparation for Confirmation and to the act itself and its significance. Thus, what has been said about the instruction of the first communicants must be considered as a desideratum, but not as a condition for intercommunion.

3. Lastly, in order to prevent any misunderstanding, we have to draw your attention to the fact that the Augustana Synod in North America and the Tamil Evangelical Lutheran Church in South India, which may be considered as daughter communities of the Church of Sweden, and with which our Church has intercommunion and a very intimate fellowship also in other respects, are nevertheless quite independent Churches, so that no conclusions with regard to them can be drawn from agreements made by the Church of Sweden for the promotion of unity in the Church of Christ.

May God give His blessing to the more intimate connection between our Churches that we are now establishing, and may the Church of Christ in our countries from this connection reap rich fruits for her spiritual life.

May we thus also be made better fitted to become instruments in the hand of God for the establishing of the bond of unity and peace between the disciples of Christ all over the earth!

STOCKHOLM,
April 21, 1922.

Signed on behalf of the Conference of Bishops of the Church of Sweden, holden at Sankta Clara, Stockholm, April 20 to 21, 1922.

NATHAN SÖDERBLOM.
Archbishop of Upsala.

GOTTFRID BILLING.
Bishop of Lund.

HJI DANELL.
Bishop of Skara.
Svenska Bishopskonferensens delegation.

REVIEWS

THE ARAMAIC ORIGIN OF THE FOURTH GOSPEL*

Professor Burney's essay upon the linguistic affinities of the Fourth Gospel is a book of real interest. Those who reject the apostolic authorship of that enigmatic work and reckon its historical value low have been in the past far too prone to treat the Fourth Gospel as a Gentile production, as something "Alexandrian"—*i.e.*, Greek and non-Semitic. The book before us does not discuss the historical value of the Gospel, and Dr. Burney is inclined to doubt that the author was St. John the Apostle (p. 133), but so far from regarding the Gospel as Greek and Alexandrian in tone and idiom, he believes it to be wholly Semitic, the translation of a work conceived and composed in Aramaic by John of Asia. This John is the "presbyter," not the son of Zebedee, but a Jerusalemite of priestly family (p. 142).

The special feature in this conclusion is the thesis that the Gospel, including the Prologue, is a translation from an Aramaic original. Aramaic features in the style are Asyndeton (pp. 49-56), Parataxis (pp. 56-63), Casus pendens (pp. 63-65), features which Dr. Burney illustrates from original Aramaic documents such as Dan. ii. 4^b-vii. and the Acts of Thomas. On p. 69 ff. the Johannine use of ἵνα is discussed, and it is shown to be practically equivalent to the Aramaic *dĕ* (or *dī*), a particle which, just like our English "that," may stand for all cases of the relative pronoun, as well as for the conjunction ὅτι and even to some extent for ὅτε (="when"). The excessive use of the Personal Pronouns—ἐγώ, σύ, αὐτόσ, etc.—corresponds to Aramaic usage; so does the Historic Present in "John," and the many Imperfects in plain narration. Of all these things the use of ἵνα is perhaps the most striking. It occurs also in Mark, and accordingly such sentences as οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν κρυπτὸν ἐὰν μὴ ἵνα φανερωθῇ (Mark iv. 22) are justly held to point to an Aramaic basis from which directly or indirectly they have been translated.† But John ix. 22, a passage in the Evangelist's own narrative, has the same use of ἵνα: he tells us "the Jews agreed *that* if any one should confess Christ he should be put out of the Synagogue," but the word he employs is ἵνα, literally "*in order that.*" No doubt, in modern Greek, νά has come to

* C. F. Burney, *The Aramaic Origin of the Fourth Gospel.* Oxford, 1922.

† The meaning of this sentence is that what is concealed will be manifest in due course, as Matt. x. 26 and Luke viii. 7 actually say; it does not really mean that there is nothing concealed except for the purpose of being manifested! But that is what the Greek means literally as it stands.

mean "that," very much like the English conjunction, but Dr. Burney points out how Matthew and Luke tend to avoid Mark's use of ἵνα in this unclassical sense. It was therefore not good Greek at the end of the first century, and so its continual occurrence in the Fourth Gospel is likely to have had the same origin as its more occasional occurrence in Mark—viz., an Aramaic source.

The supreme test that shows a work to be a translation from another language is the demonstration that certain passages are mistranslated. The passages in the Fourth Gospel which Dr. Burney regards as mistranslated are collected by him in Chapter VII. First of all come the rather numerous instances where the Aramaic *dī* or *dĕ* (="that") has been wrongly rendered, of which there are fifteen or sixteen instances. A typical example is John ix. 36, where the man who had been blind says: "And who is he, Lord, that I may believe on him?" This, Dr. Burney thinks, ought to have been, "And who is he, Lord, on whom I should believe?" I must confess that I am not quite convinced that these passages are, strictly speaking, mistranslations. I think Dr. Burney is right in regarding the Evangelist, the man who tells the story, as thinking in Aramaic. He wanted the convenient ambiguity of the Aramaic particle, whatever Greek be chosen to express it, and the result is that he often chooses the least obvious and appropriate of the alternatives, none of which are really absent from his mind.

This may seem over-subtle, but I well remember my own difficulties in attempting to represent in English the Syriac text of the Beatitudes. In the Syriac, "Matt. v. 4 may mean 'Happy is it for mourners who will be comforted,' as well as 'Happy is it for mourners because they will be comforted.' . . . Here the question is complicated by the very strong probability that the original Aramaic saying corresponded in form and therefore in ambiguity to the Syriac before us" (*Evangelion da-Mepharreshe* ii. 267). In the end I put "Happy is it for the mourners, that they shall be comforted." This may have been awkward, but it was not a mistranslation. I do not feel sure that these passages from the Fourth Gospel are not of the same character. In John ix. 36 the expression seems to me rather awkward than incorrect.

In John xvii. 11 (p. 102) Dr. Burney wishes to read οὓς δέδωκάς μοι for the better attested reading ᾧ δέδωκάς μοι, which certainly gives no sense. But the difficulties of a translator are not transmitted in later scribal variants. If we are to rewrite the Greek of this passage, on the assumption that an indeclinable relative pronoun was in the Evangelist's mind, is not ὅς the required form? The sense, then, will be, "Keep

them in Thy name, Thou who hast granted to Me that they should be one as We are."

In three passages Dr. Burney has accepted the extremely ingenious emendations of Dr. C. J. Ball. These deserve especial notice, as if they are to be approved they are decisive. Here, again, I must confess to remain unconvinced. The suggestion on p. 104 that πρῶτόσ μου in John i. 15 represents an original *qadmay*, so that the sense is "first of all" (not "before me") is attractive enough, but I am convinced that the other two are untenable.* The first is the pair of passages—John i. 5, xii. 35—where "darkness" is said καταλαμβάνειν, to "catch" something, as a belated traveller is "caught" by nightfall. This is a most natural expression in the context of John xii. 35: it has even been introduced into the Greek text of John vi. 17[b] by some early "Western" MSS. John i. 5 is more difficult, but I venture to think the difficulty mainly lies in our over-scientific view of "darkness" as merely the absence of light Light and Dark are to the natural man like Day and Night, ever circling round and round and "catching" each other That is seen in Nature, but in the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel the Light there spoken of is declared not to be subject to the periodic eclipse of Day. But Dr. Burney (p. 29), following a suggestion of Dr. Ball, supposes the original Aramaic to have meant "the darkness darkened it not," in which case a verb might have been employed which could be easily confused with one that means "received."† I fail to see what is gained, except a quite meaningless assonance. And the existing Greek text is not accounted for, as καταλαμβάνειν is never used to render *qabbel* "receive."

Again, I cannot follow Dr. Burney and Dr. Ball in getting rid of "the *Lamb* of God" in John i. 29 and substituting for it "God's *Boy*," an assumed equivalent of "the Servant of the LORD" in Isaiah (p. 107). One of the words for "lamb" is also used in Aramaic for "child," "boy," the feminine being familiar to us all in the form *Talitha*. The fact that our Lord used *ṭalitha* for "girl" is good evidence that the masculine *ṭalya* was used at the time for "boy," but I cannot think it likely that *ṭalya* was ever used as an Aramaic equivalent in the title Servant of the LORD (literally, of course, "slave of Jahweh"), except in word-for-word retranslations from the LXX. Surely it is only in Greek that "slave" is turned into παῖσ, an ambiguous word that may mean "son" or "servant," like our word "boy." I doubt if Aramaic-speaking Christians

* On p. 104, l. 7, what authority can Dr. Burney or Dr. Ball produce for "*hăwê* a by-form of the Perfect *hăwā*"?

† *Maqbel* "darkening," but *Měqabbel* "receiving."

would ever have thought of applying the "Servant" passages in Isaiah to our Lord, for though some Jewish Christians may have had what is called a "low" Christology, I do not suppose they ever thought of Jesus as "God's *slave*." Greek-speaking Christians, on the other hand, such as St. Luke, who found in their Scriptures prophecies about a παῖσ whom the Lord God had chosen, had no difficulty in regarding these utterances as referring to Jesus. If this fact about the "Servant of the Lord" is remembered, I do not think a conjecture which puts the phrase, in a very questionable Aramaic rendering, into the mouth of John the Baptist needs further refutation. That John the Baptist, as depicted in John i. 29, should perceive the sacrificial significance of "Jesus of Nazareth, the son of Joseph" (i. 45), may be a doctrinal anachronism, but there are many things of the sort in the Fourth Gospel: to make him allude to the suffering Servant in Aramaic as a *ṭalya* appears to me a linguistic impossibility.

I have felt it necessary to express my dissent from Dr. Burney's explanations of John i. 5 and i. 29 at some length, because they would be decisive for his thesis if true, and their weakness is most apparent from the Aramaic side. It is these two explanations which would have forced us to regard the Fourth Gospel as a translation rather than the work of an author who thought in Aramaic and used the Greek language accordingly. The main part of the book, Dr. Burney's own work apart from Dr. Ball's too ingenious conjectures, seems to me worthy of very careful consideration. It is now sixteen years since I committed myself to the statement that the author of the Fourth Gospel seems to have once "belonged to the Sadducean party, to have been indeed himself a Priest" (*Gospel History and its Transmission*, p. 248). It is a satisfaction to find this view confirmed by Dr. Burney from a totally different line of approach, and if I have pointed out certain things which seem to me hazardous it is because I feel it most important that sound views in this difficult study should not be encumbered with untenable baggage. Untenable details in the end only hinder our progress; we must abandon them if we are to get to the desired goal—ἵνα μὴ σκοτία ἡμᾶσ καταλάβῃ.

F. C. Burkitt.

MATERIALS FOR THE STUDY OF THE APOSTOLIC GNOSIS. By Thomas Simcox Lea, D.D., and F. Bligh Bond. Part II., Sections I. and II. Oxford: Blackwell. 6s each.

These two small volumes form a supplement to a larger work which has preceded them, and has evoked genuine, if guarded, praise from reviewers, who have, in fact, been greatly puzzled. In examining the system described and illustrated with so much reverent belief in its efficacy we confine ourselves to the later volumes, where the assumptions are set out and their consequences exhibited in abundant detail.

Briefly, these "materials" supply a plan of interpreting the Scriptures which yields cryptic meanings for every sentence, so that the words of Scripture are said to have more than their grammatical meaning, and to have concealed within themselves hidden truths which can be brought to light by the application of a key fitted to unlock their closed secrets. These "cryptic meanings" are based upon the Greek numeral system, in which the letters of their alphabet were used to express certain numbers. The world has so long enjoyed the simple and comprehensive system of Arabic counting that most people have ceased to study any other. We give a brief account of the way devised by the Greeks, which was ineffective and cumbersome in comparison with the Arabic method.

The system used by our authors is the one in full force by Greek writers in the third century B.C. It first appears on coins about 250 B.C., and was put together by some learned man as an improvement upon an older system. Later the Hebrews copied it from the Greeks.

A table is necessary:

Units.		*Tens.*		*Hundreds.*	
α	1	ι	10	ρ	100
β	2	κ	20	σ	200
γ	3	λ	30	τ	300
δ	4	μ	40	υ	400
ϵ	5	ν	50	ϕ	500
ζ	7	ξ	60	χ	600
η	8	o	70	ψ	700
θ	9	π	80	ω	800

We quote two examples of the use the writers make of this numeral system:

In Rom. xv. 10 St. Paul writes: "Rejoice, ye Gentiles, with His people." The Greek numeral system applied to the original words gives this result:

$\epsilon\upsilon\phi\rho\acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\eta\tau\epsilon\ \check{\epsilon}\theta\nu\eta\ \mu\epsilon\tau\grave{\alpha}\ \tau o\hat{\upsilon}\ \lambda\alpha o\hat{\upsilon}\ \alpha\grave{\upsilon}\tau o\hat{\upsilon} = 4238$
$\tau\grave{o}\ \phi\hat{\omega}\varsigma\ {}'I\eta\sigma o\hat{\upsilon}\ \chi\rho\iota\sigma\tau o\hat{\upsilon} =$ The light of Jesus Christ $= 4238$

The numerals are assigned to each Greek letter, and in the result the aggregate numbers prove to be equal.

Again, a passage is taken from Ps. lxxxv., in the Septuagint Version, and treated thus:

"Mercy and truth are met together."

ἔλεος	310	*Derived sentences*	(*a*)	χριστὸς ..	1480
καὶ	31			Μαριὰμ ..	192
					—1672
ἀλήθεια ..	64		(*b*)	οἴκημα ..	149
συνήντησαν ..	1267			κυρίου ..	1000
	—1672			ἡ	8
				πάρθενος	515
					—1672
			(*c*)	Ἐλισαβέτ	553
				Ἰωάννης ..	1119
					—1672

We are invited to believe that all these derived sentences are the interpretation and cryptic meanings of the original one. The writers appear to have persuaded themselves that the Septuagint Version is an inspired translation (Part II., Section I., p. 10), and they attach a sacredness to the Greek numerical system. As a first test we use a different code arbitrarily chosen, applying the numbers 1 to 24 to the letters of the Greek alphabet from α to ω

This code produces a corresponding result:

ἔλεος	54	*Derived sentences*	(*a*)	πατὴρ ..	60
καὶ	20			ἀεὶ ..	15
ἀλήθεια ..	42			καὶ ..	20
συνήντησαν ..	129			φῶς ..	63
	—			καὶ ..	20
	245			χάρις ..	67
					—245
			(*b*)	Ἰησοῦς ..	87
				ἐκ σαρκὸς	97
				καὶ ..	15
				θεός ..	46
					—245

Are we to say that these two are included in the number of cryptic meanings though they are obtained by a different code?

Neither the Greek alphabet nor any Greek code is essential to the system. We take the English alphabet, assigning to its letters the numbers 1 to 26 with the following results:

God is truth.
26, 28, 87 = 141

(*a*) O only believe.
15, 66, 60 = 141

(*b*) Ah, I do not believe.
9, 9, 14, 49, 60 = 141

Or, again:

I am that I am.
9, 14, 49, 9, 14 = 95

(*a*) *God Jehovah.* 26, 69 = 95

(*b*) Yea, a deity. 31, 1, 63 = 95

The principle, therefore, works apart from the Greek alphabet or any special code. These variants by no means exhaust the possibilities of the system, which can be made to produce most contradictory results, all of which cannot be cryptic meanings of the original.

Enough has now been said to prove that whether the Greek or English alphabet be used, and if differing codes be applied, sentences which appear to be interpretations of the original sentence can be obtained. A code—*i.e.*, an ordered succession of numbers—is essential, and aggregate equality is the point of contact. The possible permutations and combinations of the letters will produce a very large number of sentences, most of which have to be rejected, though one or more will yield a meaning which can conceivably be called a cryptic meaning.

Those who make the experiment of trying for themselves will learn that they are manipulating with figures rather than with words, and with figures which bear a fixed relationship to each other. As in all arithmetical puzzles, experience teaches efficiency. A useful method of proceeding is to write down on several sheets of paper a large number of the words you wish to employ, adding to each its numerical equivalent according to the code used.

With these before the eyes the selection can begin, and the process of addition and subtraction will at last produce the aggregate equality expressed in some sentence which arrests attention. These sentences can be varied by a change in the list of words with which you decide to work. This and nothing more is, we believe, the reason for these " cryptic meanings " which surprise the devout searcher, and for which he seeks an explanation in some preordained concealment of hidden meaning rather than in the laws of numbers which combine to produce in an abundance of ways the same numerical result.

So far we have dealt with serious sentences because in the two volumes we are criticizing the writers introduce none but the most solemn and sacred words. With our opinion that the results are wholly independent of the subject-matter we have made one experiment.

If our contention be right, that these " secondary meanings " of sentences are due to arithmetical reasons, they should be independent of the language used, or of its subject-matter, or of the code employed. We therefore take as an example an

English nursery rhyme and apply to it our English code. The result can be exhibited thus:

Jack and Jill went up the hill	260	Are you hurt, Jill	195
To fetch a pail of water ..	199	Alas, Jill, my broken head ..	197
Jack fell down and broke his crown	245	Ah, spilt water cannot be collected	305
And Jill came tumbling after	232	Water flows downhill ..	239
	936		936

Lest anyone should attribute to us too much labour and ingenuity in obtaining these "cryptic sentences," we give our experience.

The four sentences were chosen at random, and when the code numbers had been attached to the words their aggregate was found to be 43 short of the 936 required. The deficiency was at once supplied by adding Jill (43) to the second sentence.

The result is quite entertaining in the limited intellectual sphere within which it moves, and the exclamations and reflections have some sense because this was put into them when they were framed.

The permutations and combinations of so many letters, each of which can be used as often as we wish, will produce an unlimited number of sentences, some meaningless, some serious, some frivolous, some irreverent, but all equally satisfying our code condition and all equally valueless. On the principle so gravely advanced as a method of interpreting Holy Scripture, we are invited to believe they may all be cryptic meanings of the nursery rhyme, concealed in its words and presumably put there for a purpose. This treatment of any language reduces the science of writing to ridicule, and plays havoc with the serious laws which create languages and govern literature.

We invite the two writers of these volumes to examine their system in the light of our criticism of its results and of its adaptation to other subject-matter.

Their πρῶτον ψεῦδος, their primary fallacy, appears to us to be the assumption that when, in consequence of assigning a code of numbers to the letters of any alphabet, two sentences are discovered to yield the same aggregate number, that is a sure evidence of a connection between them. Hence all the talk about cryptic meanings of passages of Scripture. We believe that nothing more has happened than an arithmetical coincidence cunningly devised with an object in view.

Our authors are quite aware that many different cryptic meanings can be found in the same sentence, and in some of their pages they exhibit long lists of such variations, all of which

appear to them to prove no more than the wealth and variety of meaning which can, by their system, be extracted from solemn sentences of great religious import. We, too, have discovered many varied sentences, but refrain from drawing attention to the frivolous ones which the system can be used to produce out of deeply solemn words. We part from these two small volumes with admiration for the patient industry which has examined so many figures and added up so many numbers, but with the feeling that all this labour has added nothing of value to the elucidation of the meaning of Holy Scripture.

HENRY LOWTHER CLARKE, *Bishop.*

IMMORTALITY AND THE UNSEEN WORLD. By the Rev. W. O. E. Oesterley, D.D. S.P.C.K. Pp. x+231. 12s. 6d.

There seems to be an impression in certain quarters that in order to find real scholarship, especially in Biblical matters, it is necessary to apply to Germany. Whilst it is true that far more technical works of this kind are published in German than in any other language (though some of the most brilliant of their writers are Swiss or Austrian), it by no means follows that the best work is done in Germany, still less that that country has a monopoly of brains. On the contrary, it may not unfairly be maintained by those who are in a position to be best acquainted with the *personnel* of British Old Testament scholarship that, given equal opportunities of publication, this country would not merely stand on a level with any other, but might well take a genuine leadership.

Within the last twelve months two volumes of the highest value have appeared in English on Old Testament subjects. One is, of course, Dr. Gray's *Commentary on the Book of Job* (I.C.C.), the other is this volume of Dr. Oesterley's. Whether one considers the scholarship implied throughout the book, or the completeness with which the field has been surveyed, or the sanity of the conclusions reached and the skill with which they are presented, it is clear that we have a work whose importance it is difficult to overrate.

The author has seen that it is impossible to approach such a subject as that which he has selected without endeavouring to treat it on comparative lines. Yet he has not been indiscriminate in his search for parallels. He has not offered his readers that kind of undigested mass of material collected from every quarter of the globe which seems to be so characteristic of the comparative anthropologist. He has rightly seen that whilst there are certain customs and beliefs which may

fairly be called the common property of primitive man, it will be only those nations who are closest to Israel in blood, tradition, or geographical position whose light will be of real value. Consequently, his work gains in conciseness from the fact that the larger portion of his comparative references are to Babylonian ideas and practices. Mainly from them, but also in part from other peoples and even from relics in the Old Testament itself, he is able to give us a picture of the popular Israelite beliefs down to the time of the exile.

This side of Dr. Oesterley's researches serves to bring out the fact that Israel had much in common with her neighbours. This is important, but even more so is the stress that Dr. Oesterley lays on the uniqueness of Jewish belief. He makes the distinction between the " popular " and the " official " doctrines. The former is that which seems to have been held by practically all ancient Semitic peoples—namely, that after death the soul still survived in some sort of connection with the body, but at the same time had a home to which it could go in Sheol. But it was by no means confined to Sheol. There were those who were able to control and hold communion with the dead. They might be worshipped; they were more often consulted, and in early times, even in Israel, Necromancy seems to have been recognized as a lawful means of discovering the future. This is the first stage.

But with the growth of the idea of God, especially as expounded by the great Israelite prophets, and exemplified in a book like Deuteronomy, the unique demands of Yahweh (whose name, by the way, Dr. Oesterley spells in the German fashion, " Jahve "—why ?) made it impossible for the religion in its later and purer forms to continue the worship or even the consultation of any other than the God of Israel. It is, indeed, on this practical monotheism that all the real efficiency of Hebrew religion as a spiritual force ultimately depends. The modern analogue of Necromancy is Spiritism. The modern condemnation of Spiritism is that it is false, that the spirits are not really consulted. The prophetic condemnation of Necromancy was that it was true, that it involved the cult of spiritual beings other than Yahweh. It was not fraud; it was apostasy. But the belief in spirits who could be dealt with was so deeply rooted that it was necessary to get men to believe that their dead were altogether out of their reach. Hence arose what Dr. Oesterley calls the " official " view of the existence after death, the view that is most familiar to us from the writings of the Old Testament. On this view the spirit was bound down to Sheol, whence it could not be released, either for its own purposes or for those of other people.

Dr. Oesterley, then, rightly calls attention to the change made by the exile. Not the least important element therein was the growth of individualism in religion. A man stood by himself in direct relation of a personal kind to his God, and was not merely a member of a tribe or people to whom the God also belonged. One sees that this must lead to a third stage as the idea of God grew. One cannot think of a God as the prophets saw Him, and yet believe that He could lose His grip on any soul whom He had once made His own. So finally Israel came, after ages of search and generations of suffering, to a doctrine of immortality in the full sense of the word, such a doctrine as Jesus held and taught. This is the third stage, and it brought Israel to the point at which the supreme revelation of God in Jesus became possible.

This is what Dr. Oesterley has to say, and he says it clearly and convincingly, with a wealth of detail and abundant proof for each step in his progress. It could not have been said better.

T. H. Robinson.

NOTICES

Proposed Amendments to the Text of the Psalter prepared by the Committee on the Psalter Text of the Prayer-Book Commission to be presented to the Convention of 1922. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1921.

The Upper House of Canterbury in 1913 asked the Archbishop to take such steps as might seem to him advisable in order to secure "the revision of passages in the Psalter in which the language is specially obscure or misleading." A special Committee of clergy and laymen was appointed by His Grace October 14, 1913. They brought out a report with a list of alterations and a careful explanation of the principles on which they had made or refrained from making changes within the narrow limits of their instruction. This report, and afterwards a full text of the Psalter embodying the changes, were published by S.P.C.K. in 1916. The Bishops of Gloucester and Truro considered this revision and reported on it by January 1, 1918. Sixteen of the Committee's alterations they thought unnecessary, twenty-three unsuccessful, and twenty-eight passages they thought required alteration where the Committee had proposed none.

No explanation of the "Proposed Amendments" in this little book from New York is given, except the prefixed "resolutions of the Convention of 1919" in fourteen lines; but it is evident that the revision of 1913-16 is the base. The American Committee have made many additions and alterations, but seldom of more than minor importance. The English Committee seem to have trusted the usage of the country rather than of the town, and were not afraid to keep such old-fashioned words as "quick" for "alive," "learn" for "teach," or a few racy

expressions like "high stomach": no doubt these would not do in America. They tried, too, to preserve the flavour of Coverdale, and never admitted the plural form "peoples" unless it was undoubtedly necessary. In our Authorized Version it is to be found in Revelation; Landor gibes at it as a new trick of his own day; the American Committee introduce it perhaps too freely.

If a retouching be all that is required in the Psalter of the Prayer-Book the 1913 Committee's work is very commendable. The retention of "as upon a horse" in lxviii. 4 is the worst blot upon it. If more be wanted some "greatly daring" experiment like Canon Dalton's, in his edition of *The Book of Common Prayer containing Proposals and Suggestions* (Cambridge University Press, 1920), must be allowed: half-measures will not answer. Canon Dalton's originality and verve is balanced by his attention to the earlier Coverdale, so he preserves the tradition of masculine English.

A good example of remodelling by the 1913 revision, adopted by the American Committee, may be seen in lxviii. 30:

> Rebuke Thou the dragon and the bull, with the multitude of the heathen, so that they humbly bring pieces of silver: scatter Thou the people that delight in war.

But in v. 22 of the same Psalm they have rejected the 1913 restoration of the true sense of the original, by reinstating "mine own." The Hebrew is very grim: the Lord will head off the escaping enemy and turn them back for horrid slaughter. The unrevised Prayer-Book and the Americans would vaguely soften this to the return of the dispersed faithful. In this verse "Lord" has the ordinary spelling, for it represents an actual *Adonai* in the Hebrew text. Where the Hebrew has JAHVEH the American Committee adopt the capitals, LORD, of A.V. and R.V., an inconspicuous and useful innovation; but it has not been quite consistently carried through. It may be interesting to give Psalm lxxxvii. in full from the 1913 revision, with the modifications of the American Committee in the margin:

Her foundations are upon the holy hills: the Lord loveth the gates of Sion more than all the dwellings of Jacob.	
Very excellent things are spoken of thee: thou city of God.	
I will make mention of Egypt and Babylon: among them that know me.	as among
Behold ye the Philistines also, and they of Tyre, with the Morians: lo, in Sion were they born.	Behold, Philistia also, and Tyre, with Ethiopia:
Yea, of Sion it shall be reported, These and these were born in her: and the Most High shall stablish her.	
The Lord shall rehearse it when He writeth up the peoples: lo, in Sion were they born.	record
The singers also and trumpeters shall make answer:	
All my fresh springs are in thee.	

A. NAIRNE.

AN INTRODUCTION TO ECCLESIASTICAL LATIN. By Rev. H. P. V. Nunn, M.A., St. John's College, Cambridge. Author of *The Elements of New Testament Greek*, *A Short Syntax of New Testament Greek*. Cambridge University Press, 1922. Pp. xiii+162. 6s. net.

There are cheering indications that the serious study of Later Latin is growing considerably, and there was room for an English work which would give a clear and full presentation of the Syntax of the later language. This Mr. Nunn has attempted to provide; his book contains first, "a summary of such syntactical rules as are necessary for the understanding of the works" of the ecclesiastical writers, and, secondly, a selection of passages from Perpetua, Cyprian, Ambrose, Jerome, Augustine, Bede, Adamnan, Thomas Aquinas, and Thomas à Kempis. Mr. Nunn's works for late beginners in N. T. Greek have been of such service that he might have been the very one to do a similar service to beginners in ecclesiastical Latin, had he waited until he was more fully informed and better read in it. In general method and in detail this present work contains very much that is unsatisfactory. It is hardly fair to blame the exclusiveness of the Ciceronians and at the same time to adopt a similar attitude towards the pagan contemporaries of the Latin Fathers: ecclesiastical Latin is not to be sundered so entirely from later pagan Latin: a linguistic commentator on, say, Augustine or the Latin Bible cannot afford to leave his Apuleius unread.* Nor, again, does it seem wise to include both Patristic and Scholastic under the one rubric; the Angelic Doctor and the author of the *Imitatio* present difficulties and peculiarities of their own.

Mr. Nunn's pages on syntax might better have followed the graphically clear method of the Parallel Grammar series: his distinctions between classical and ecclesiastical Latin are not seldom inaccurate, often nebulous, and almost always bewildering till one studies his examples. That these examples are taken from the Vulgate N. T. seems rather strange after the naïve statement (p. ix), that "it is not to be assumed . . . that the Vulgate is to be regarded as typical of ecclesiastical Latin." Why not rather have given us simply a study of Vulgate syntax such as is now in preparation for the S.P.C.K.?

This book is unfortunately unsuited for the purpose intended: it is far from clear; it is uninformed or misinformed; in details it shows clearly a "'prentice hand." The bibliography is meagre; English scholars like J. E. B. Mayor and Prof. Souter are not mentioned. Facing the title-page and on pp. 126-127, passages from Jerome's *Epistulæ* are taken from old and uncritical editions; the former is susceptible of eight corrections by the Vienna text, the latter (forty-three lines) of twenty-three. And on the title-page is perpetrated *Nepontianum!*

Misprints are few (*e.g.*, p. 3, note 2, read *du*), and care has evidently been given in writing and correction, which makes it all the more regrettable that Mr. Nunn has not given us what would have been a real and valuable acquisition to later Latin studies.

J. H. BAXTER.

THE EARLY FRANCISCANS AND JESUITS. A Study in Contrasts. By Arthur S. B. Freer, M.A. S.P.C.K. 6s.

It is very important to keep alive the interest in Franciscan study which, since the publication of M. Paul Sabatier's *Life*, has steadily

* Though Mr. Nunn does quote Apuleius at least once (p. 52).

increased in this country. We owe much to Mr. J. M. Dent and other publishers who have given us such excellent English translations of the early Lives of St. Francis.

For a compact statement of what we have learnt about the early Franciscan movement one could not wish for anything better than these lectures of Mr. Freer's. But there is an added interest in this book in the contrast which the author has drawn between the Franciscans and the Jesuits. In both cases there is the lamentable departure from the ideals of the founders. We cannot help loving both St. Ignatius Loyola and St. Francis, nor can we help deploring the failure of both movements to maintain the original spirit. But the history of Franciscanism is much less depressing than that of the Jesuits. The spirit of joy and freedom and humanity started by the genius of St. Francis can never die, and in the nature of things it matters much less in his case than in that of St. Ignatius what has become of the Order. It was not to found an Order that St. Francis lived: it was to inspire the whole Church of Christ. Thus it is that the " Third Order " turns out to be much more the outcome of his life than the Order of the Brothers Minor. And herein is the value of Franciscanism to our age. We need an inspiration that can be breathed into the dead bones of the whole Church. The corpse-like obedience of the Jesuits may succeed in producing a military Order to do a special work at a special time; but it is the freedom of St. Francis, his love of our Lord and of all God's creatures, which becomes a permanent inspiration for all kinds of Christians and at all periods.

JAMES ADDERLEY.

THE BIBLICAL HISTORY OF THE HEBREWS. By F. J. Foakes-Jackson, D.D. Fourth edition (enlarged) with maps. Heffer, Cambridge. 10s. net.

The fact that this popular handbook of Old Testament history has now reached a fourth edition is evidence of its ability to meet the need for such a work; this popularity would, however, seem to render any long notice unnecessary, especially as the present edition, apart from two new chapters, does not differ from its immediate predecessor.

It is to be regretted that the author was unable to increase the usefulness of his handbook by noticing, if only briefly, the not inconsiderable amount of work on the Old Testament and allied subjects which has been produced since the previous edition (1909); it may be that his preoccupation with other fields of study has prevented Dr. Foakes-Jackson from keeping in sufficiently close touch with Old Testament scholarship for this task; in any case, it is matter for regret.

The two additional chapters call for fuller notice. In chapter xv. the salient facts of the involved period of Jewish history between Malachi and John the Baptist are clearly stated in a remarkably small compass. At first sight it might seem strange that this period should be included in a biblical history at all; but, as Dr. Foakes-Jackson quite justly points out, the Apocrypha is a real part of the Bible and entitled to receive treatment as such. In the concluding chapter, on " Jewish Literature and Life," Dr Foakes Jackson is not nearly so successful and his attempt to compress this vast subject, which involves a survey of many of the works known as Pseudepigraphal, into the small space at his disposal involves dealing with it in a manner so slight as to be inadequate, and indeed unworthy.

The additional chapters, and the notes upon them, are marred by some bad lapses both of language and punctuation. These appear to be the result of careless proof-reading, for one cannot imagine that the learned author really spells *hare* as *hair* (p. 386), or that his amazing (and possibly libellous) statement that men were invited " to become Jews by lustral washing and not by Mr. Lanchester " (p. 474) represents his considered opinion.

L. Elliott Binns.

BOOK NOTES

Shaken Beliefs. By T. A. Lacey. Mowbray. 1s. 6d.

Canon Lacey is always vivid and interesting as well as weighty, and these three lectures, delivered at All Saints', Margaret Street, are well worth reading. His main points are that the creeds are not shaken, but believers are, largely because the enveloping religious habits of fifty years ago have disappeared; and that to ask men to make the adventure of faith is a perfectly reasonable demand.

Mountain Pathways : A Study in the Ethics of the Sermon on the Mount. By Hector Waylen. Kegan Paul. 3s. 6d.

A new edition of a book first published in 1909. The standpoint is that of the Society of Friends. The writer has a wide, if not very deep, knowledge of modern critical studies, and some of his notes are illuminating.

On the Rim of the World. By J. Paterson-Smyth. Hodder and Stoughton. 3s. 6d.

People who have lost their friends and are in doubt as to their state are depicted as being " on the rim of the world," peering out into eternity. To such the well-known author gives instruction and consolation in a vivid conversational manner. The book is admirably fitted as a present for orthodox Christians who accept Bible texts as sufficient evidence for statements, but are in a fog as regards the implications of their belief. It does not profess to deal with the difficulties of others.

Christianizing the Heathen : First-hand Information concerning Overseas Missions. By H. B. Bonner. Watts and Co. 170 pp. 3s. 6d.

This book is necessarily distasteful to Christians, but is none the less valuable on this account. The R.P.A., in pursuit of its propaganda, has issued a *questionnaire* to correspondents in all parts of the world, and on the basis of their answers has arranged for the present compilation. An advocate of missions who had studied it carefully would be prepared for any amount of heckling. The presupposition is that the object is useless if not actually harmful. Here no argument is possible. But the methods in vogue are severely criticized, and here there is much to be learned. However, the author cannot be severer than are missionary leaders themselves on unworthy methods, and if she helps us in however slight a degree to make our methods more worthy of our cause, she will not have written in vain.

The Miracles in St. John's Gospel and their Teaching on Eternal Life. By T. W. Gilbert. Longmans. 2s. 6d.

This is a very slight treatment of a difficult subject, based on lectures delivered ito a Tutorial Class at Oxford. Old-fashioned Bible-lovers will find it helpful in tracing the development of thought in the Gospel.

We have counted nineteen misprints in thirty-three Greek words. A long note on the difference between *αἰτεῖν* and *ἐρωτᾶν* is apparently drawn from Trench's *Synonyms*. But the distinction is generally given up by modern grammarians (see Acts iii. 2, 3). In any case arguments based on Greek refinements are out of place in a work the justification for which is the needs of the unlearned.

The Story of the Passion: its own Message considered in Simple Addresses. By Henry Wace, D.D., Dean of Canterbury. Murray. 7s. 6d.

These are the addresses delivered by Dr. Wace during Holy Week in Canterbury Cathedral for the last nineteen years. They contain the traditional exegesis of the Church with everything strained off that might seem unreal. That is to say, they are thoroughly English. To those who find Papini's glowing chapters congenial the Dean's addresses may appear pedestrian. Nor do they show the insight into Scripture of Dr. Stalker's well-known book on the Trial and Death of Christ. Much of their impressiveness is due to the personality of the author, who is little more than a name to the younger people of to-day. But the book is strong and wise; it will be welcomed by the Dean's many friends, and no one could study it without benefit.

Lord, Teach Us to Pray: Sermons on Prayer. By Alexander Whyte, D.D. Hodder and Stoughton. 7s. 6d.

The author was, in the words of the Preface, "by general consent the greatest Scottish preacher of his day." In this volume a number of sermons are collected dealing with the subject of prayer. They are full of volcanic energy and deep spirituality. The style is beautiful, that of a man soaked through and through with the English Bible and a few great authors, such as Plutarch, Augustine, Andrewes, Pascal, and Butler. Generally austerely simple, it frequently rises to the grand manner. The book can be warmly recommended to English clergy. But they will have to ask themselves what sermons preached to southern congregations will have an effect comparable to that produced by these in Scotland. The preacher says: "Such subjects can only be set before a specially intelligent and a specially interested and a specially devotional audience. I entirely believe that I have such an audience"; and the sermons, as they stand, would not appeal in England. Why not? Those who are anxious for reunion with Scotch Presbyterianism would do well to essay an answer to this question. One can imagine a concord reached by Church leaders breaking down because the rank and file could not understand one another. Much in this book makes an Anglican reader ashamed of himself and his fellow-Churchmen. Then he comes across a description of Dr. Candlish's forenoon prayer given for our admiration.

"He so came and reasoned together with God in that prayer. Sometimes he would take us to our knees till we had knees like James the Just, as he led us through the whole of Paul's reasoning with God and with man in the Epistle to the Romans. Sometimes he would argue like Job, and would not be put down; and then he would weep like Jeremiah and dance and sing like Isaiah. That great preacher was an Elijah both in his passions and in his prayers."

It sounds simply intolerable, but Dr. Whyte spoke of "his incomparably privileged people."

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